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NOTES
St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet:
The Tax that Would Not Die
BY RICK ALSIP,* JENNIFER BAILEY,"
MELISSA BOWMAN,** WILLIAM G. FOWLER II,*...
& TREY GRAYSON*****
INTRODUCTION
arly this decade, Mr. Herschel St. Ledger, a retired civil engineer
and resident of Anchorage, Kentucky, learned that Indiana's
intangibles tax' had been declared unconstitutional in 1988.2
The Marion Superior Court held that the tax unlawfully restricted interstate
commerce by providing a commercial advantage to Indiana businesses, the
stock of which was exempt from the tax. In response to the ruling, the
Indiana General Assembly repealed the tax in 1989.1
"J.D./M.B.A. expected 1998, University of Kentucky.
J.D. expected 1998, University of Kentucky.
J.D. expected 1998, University of Kentucky.
J.D. expected 1998, University of Kentucky.
J.D./M.B.A. expected 1998, University of Kentucky.
The authors would like to thank D. Randall Gibson, Esq., Professor Kathryn L.
Moore, and Professor Rebecca S. Rudnick for their invaluable comments and
suggestions during the writing of this Note.
' An "intangibles" tax is an ad valorem tax on intangible property, including
shares of stock, notes, accounts, bank deposits, patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
2 See Indiana Dep't of State Revenue v. Felix, 571 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. 1991)
(invalidating portions ofsections 6-5.1-1-1(2) and 6-5.1-2- 1(a) ofthe Indiana Code
exempting people owning stock in Indiana corporations from Indiana's intangibles
tax, see IND. CODE §§ 6-5.1-1-1(2) and 6-5.1-2-1(a) (West 1989)).
' See Ken Berzof, Tax Attack; Group Plans Court Test of State Intangibles
Levy, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 13, 1990, at Cl.
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Mr. St. Ledger discussed the demise of the Indiana intangibles tax with
several of his friends and decided to challenge Kentucky's intangibles tax.
Mr. St. Ledger and his friend, Mr. Harold Miller, also a resident of
Anchorage, Kentucky, formed the Kentucky Intangibles Tax Committee in
an effort to raise financial support to help defray the costs of litigation4
On July 26, 1990, Mr. St. Ledger and his wife, Nicki, as the class
representatives, filed a class action challenging the validity of Kentucky's
intangibles tax in Jefferson Circuit Court.' The primary issues were the
taxation of bank deposits and shares of corporate stock and the tax's
discriminatory effect. Deposits in Kentucky-based financial institutions
were taxed at a lower rate than deposits in out-of-state institutions.
Similarly, stock holdings in out-of-state companies were subject to the tax
while holdings in Kentucky corporations were exempt. The suit alleged that
the tax scheme violated the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution,6 the state and federal guarantees ofequal protection under the
law,7 and a provision in the Kentucky Constitution mandating uniformity
and equality of taxation.8 On October 19, 1995, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky invalidated the tax on bank deposits on the ground that it violated
the Commerce Clause;9 however, the court further held that Kentucky's
intangibles tax on shares of corporate stock violated neither the United
States nor Kentucky Constitution. 0 This opinion by the Kentucky Supreme
Court will be referred to in this Note as "St. Ledger L"
Meanwhile, a similar challenge to North Carolina's intangibles tax had
been working its way through the North Carolina courts. The North
Carolina Supreme Court held in Fulton Corp. v. Justus" that North
Carolina's intangibles tax, which provided preferences to in-state busi-
nesses, was not inconsistent with the Commerce Clause of the United
4 See id.
s For convenience, this Note will follow the lead of the Kentucky courts and
refer to the plaintiffs collectively as "St. Ledger."
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7 See id. amend. XIV, § 1; KY. CONST. § 3.
8 See KY. CONST. § 171. This section provides: "Taxes shall be levied and
collected for public purposes only and shall be uniform upon all property of the
same class subject to taxation within the territorial limits of the authority levying
the tax; and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws."
9 See St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 912 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Ky. 1995)
("St. Ledger I"), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996).
'o See id. at 43; see also infra notes 327-32 and accompanying text.
" Fulton Corp. v. Justus, 450 S.E.2d 728 (N.C. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Fulton
Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996).
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States Constitution. 2 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed the decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court. In Fulton
Corp. v. Faulkner, 3 a unanimous Court held that the intangibles tax levied
in North Carolina discriminated against interstate commerce in violation
of the Commerce Clause.'
4
Before Fulton Corp. was decided, the St. Ledger case also went to the
United States Supreme Court. Because the effect of the Kentucky
intangibles tax scheme was indistinguishable from North Carolina's, 15 the
Court's decision in Fulton Corp. mandated abolition of the Kentucky
intangibles tax'insofar as it provided exemptions for in-state companies.
Consequently, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Kentucky
Supreme Court's decision. 6 On remand, the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that the entire tax was invalid because the exemption for in-state companies
was not severable from the tax scheme."7 In determining to what extent
refunds wouldbepaid, however, the court rejected the taxpayers' argument
that refunds should be available for anyone who paid the tax within two
years of the date St. Ledger I was filed. Instead, the court held that the
limitations period for taxpayer refunds was two years from the date of tax
payment, as provided by section 134.590(2) of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes. 8 This opinion on remand of the Kentucky Supreme Court will be
referred to in this Note as "St. Ledger II."
Part I of this Note provides a historical overview of the administration
of intangibles tax schemes in Kentucky and other states, focusing primarily
on exemptions for in-state companies. 9 Part II of this Note explores the use
of the compensatory tax doctrine20 as a defense to an allegation of state tax
12 See id. at 735.
" Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996).
"4 See id. at 327; see also infra notes 185-206 and accompanying text.
'5 See infra notes 108-09, 159-206, 337 and accompanying text.
16 See St. Ledger I, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996), vacating 912 S.W.2d 34 (Ky.
1995), and remanding.
" See St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 942 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Ky.)
("St. LedgerII"), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997); see also infra notes 339-41
and accompanying text.
11 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 134.590(1)-(2) (Michie Supp.
1996).
'9 See infra notes 25-112 and accompanying text.
20 A compensatory tax is a tax "'designed simply to make interstate commerce
bear a burden already borne by intrastate commerce.'" Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner,
516 U.S. 325,334 (1996) (quoting Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S.
641, 647 (1994)); see infra notes 116-28.
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discrimination, concentrating particularly on challenges to state intangibles
taxes.2' Examining the constitutional challenge to Kentucky's intangibles
tax brought by the St. Ledgers, Part III of this Note analyzes the Kentucky
Supreme Court's holdings in St. Ledger Iand St. Ledger 11.22 Part IV of this
Note discusses the Kentucky Supreme Court's holding in St. Ledger !!that
section 134.590 mandates a limitations period for taxpayer refunds of two
years from the date of tax payment, emphasizing the inherent inequities in
this result.' After applauding the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in
St. Ledger Ilto strike down the state's intangibles tax, this Note concludes
by criticizing the severe limitations that section 134.590 and St. Ledger II
place on taxpayers' ability to collect refunds. 24
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF KENTUCKY'S INTANGIBLES TAX, THE
EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE INTANGIBLES TAX IN KENTUCKY AND
OTHER STATES, AND THE MOTIVATIONS FOR EXEMPTING SHARES OF
STOCK IN "LOCAL" CORPORATIONS FROM INTANGIBLES TAXATION
A. History of Kentucky's Intangibles Tax and the Exemption for Stock
in "Local" Corporations
The power to tax intangible property - which can include everything
from shares of stock, notes, accounts, and bank deposits to patents,
copyrights and trademarks" - has never been doubted in Kentucky.26 The
21 See infra notes 113-230 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 231-350 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 351-484 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 485-87 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., K.R.S. § 132.020(2) (Michie Supp. 1996) (listing classes of intan-
gible property subject to taxation).
26 Consider the breadth of the state taxing power as described by the Kentucky
Supreme Court:
It is well settled that the power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force,
so searching in extent that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is
subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of
the authority which exercises it .... Nothing but special constitutional
limitation upon legislative authority can exclude anything to which the
authority extends from the grasp of the taxing power, if the Legislature in
its discretion shall select it for revenue purposes .... This extends to
property whether it be tangible or intangible, and it matters not in what the
intangible property consists, whether privilege, corporate franchises,
contracts or obligations. It is enough that it is property, which, though
1056 [VOL. 86
ST. LEDGER V. KENTUCKYREVENUE CABINET
intangibles tax challenged by Herschel St. Ledger was nearly 200 years
old.27 The origins of the present-day version of Kentucky's recently
invalidated intangibles tax system, and in particular the exemption for
investment holdings in corporations,28 can be traced to the 1892 Revenue
and Taxation Act. 9 Section 4020 of the Act dictated that "[a]ll real and
personal estate within this State, and all personal estate of persons residing
in this State, and of all corporations organized under the laws of this State,
whether the property be in or out of this State... shall be subject to
taxation .... 3 Section 4022 of the Act prescribed that "personal estate
shall include every other species and character of property - that which is
tangible as well as that which is intangible."' Originally, the state levied
a uniform tax of $0.425 per $100 of value upon such property.32
intangible, exists, which has value, produces income, and passes current in
the markets of the world. To ignore this intangible property or to hold that
it is not subject to taxation at its accepted value, is to eliminate from the
reach of the taxing power a large proportion of the wealth of the country.
Wolfe Co. v. Beckett, 105 S.W. 447, 447-48 (Ky. 1907). Cf Judy v. Beckwith, 114
N.W. 565, 570 (Iowa 1908) ("Except where limited by some constitutional
provision, the power of the state to tax is unlimited.").
27 See Jack Brammer, Tax on Intangibles Faces Concrete Fight, Critics Say
Levy Hurts Business Development, Elderly, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER
(Lexington, Ky.), May 17, 1992, at Al. At the time of the St. Ledger suit, 22 states
still had an intangibles tax on their books, though Kentucky's was the most
comprehensive. See id. Some states with intangibles tax laws appear not to enforce
them. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTE1N, STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION 18 n.5 to Table 6 (5th ed. 1988). Until the 1980s, Kentucky also had
enforcement problems with respect to its intangibles tax. See Brammer, supra.
2' See K.R.S. § 136.030(1). The modem version of the exemption, which was
first enacted in 1924, see infra note 62, can be characterized as exempting from
taxation shares held by residents in "local" or in-state corporations, as the
exemption applied only if 75% or more of the total corporate property was located
and taxed in Kentucky.
29 1892 Ky. Acts ch. 103. The modem version of the exemption can be traced
to 1924. See infra note 62.
30 KY. STAT. § 4020 (Carroll 1894). The authors do not substantially examine
the Kentucky intangibles tax before 1892, as the historical origins of the current
stock exemption can be traced back only as far as the Revenue and Taxation Act
of 1892.
31 Id.
32 See id. § 4019. In contrast, the 1996 intangibles tax system imposed disparate
tax rates on various types of intangibles. Compare, e.g., K.R.S. § 132.020(1)
(imposing a tax of $0.25 per $100 of value on shares of stock, notes, and bonds)
1997-981 1057
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Article III of the 1892 Revenue and Taxation Act imposed a franchise
tax, essentially a tax on corporate intangible property, on public service
corporations.33 Shares in franchise corporations were not taxed if the
corporation paid all taxes on corporate property and franchises.34 Similarly,
shares in non-franchise corporations were not taxed provided the corpora-
tion paid "the taxes on all its property of every kind."35 The plain language
of these exemptions did not appear to condition their availability on a
certain level of the corporation's entire property being taxed in Kentucky.
Despite the clear and precise statutory language, the Kentucky judiciary
struggled in applying these exemptions to situations in which a consider-
able portion of the corporate property was taxed outside Kentucky.36 These
with K.R.S. § 132.020(2) (imposing a tax of $0.015 per $100 of value on certain
intangibles that do not have a taxable situs outside Kentucky).
" See KY. STAT. § 4077 (Carroll 1894); Commonwealth v. Walsh's Trustee,
117 S.W. 398, 399 (Ky. 1909) ("Walsh's Trustee II ").
Sections 4079, 4080, and 4081 of the Kentucky Statutes governed the
determination of the value of a corporation's franchise. For domestic corporations,
the franchise's value equaled the value of its capital stock less the assessed value
of all its tangible property located and taxed in Kentucky. For foreign corporations,
the franchise's value equaled the value of its capital stock employed in Kentucky
(a percentage of the total capital stock value based on the percentage of the
corporation's total gross receipts that were attributable to its business in Kentucky,
or based on the percentage of the corporation's total lines that were actually in
Kentucky if the corporation was an interstate carrier) less the assessed value of all
tangible property located and taxed in Kentucky. See also id. at 400.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky consistently interpreted the franchise tax to
only apply to "corporations performing a public service." Providence Banking Co.
v. Webster County, 57 S.W. 14, 15 (Ky. 1900); see also Hager v. Louisville Title
Co., 85 S.W. 182, 182 (Ky. 1905) ("[C]orporations generally are not subject to a
franchise tax ... [and] corporations subject to a franchise tax are such as enjoy a
special or exclusive privilege, or a franchise not allowed by law to natural persons,
or that perform a public service.").
34 See KY. STAT. § 4088 (Carroll 1894).
31 Id. § 4085; see Commonwealth v. Steele, 104 S.W. 687, 688 (Ky. 1907)
(construing statute to make shareholders liable for taxation on their shares only if
the corporation failed to pay its taxes).
36 See Commonwealth v. Muir, 186 S.W. 195, 196 (Ky. 1916) (stating that
"endless confusion" had resulted from the application of the exemptions for shares
in franchise and non-franchise corporations); Slater v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W.
201, 202 (Ky. 1915) (same). Compare Louisville & Evansville Mail Co. v.
Barbour, 88 Ky. 73,78-79 (Ky. 1888), with Commonwealth v. Chesapeake and 0.
Ry. Co., 77 S.W. 186 (Ky. 1903). In Louisville & Evansville Mail Co., the Supreme
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early cases also provide a foundation for understanding the development
of the current exemption for shares in "local" corporations.
In Commonwealth v. Walsh's Trustee ("Walsh's Trustee I"1),37 the
Commonwealth in 1907 sought to levy the intangibles tax on shares held
by a Kentucky resident in Western Union Telegraph Company, a foreign
corporation.38 The state conceded that Western Union hadproperly paid all
taxes due Kentucky, including franchise and property taxes.39 However,
only one percent of Western Union's property was situated and taxable in
Kentucky." The stockholder argued that this case was controlled by the
unambiguous language of the exemption for shares in franchise corpora-
tions.41
The Kentucky Supreme Court disagreed. It determined that the General
Assembly intended to tax shares of stock unless the exemption applied.42
Court of Kentucky decided that the General Assembly could not have intended that
"both the property of a corporation and the stock of each member of it should be
taxed at the same time and for the same purpose" because "though it is not always
practicable to make taxation entirely equal and uniform, the [General Assembly
had] no power to directly impose double taxation." Louisville & Evansville Mail
Co., 88 Ky. at 80. Conversely, in Chesapeake and 0. Ry. Co., the Kentucky
Supreme Court found it to be "well settled that the capital stock of a corporation,
and the shares of stock held by the stockholders, for the purposes of taxation, may
be, and generally are, entirely distinct property." Chesapeake and 0. Ry. Co., 77
S.W. at 188.
Even before the Revenue and Taxation Act of 1892, Kentucky courts grappled
with whether the corporation's property was taxable, the shareholders' stock was
taxable, or'both. See Whitaker v. Brooks, 90 Ky. 63, 75 (Ky. 1890) ("[H]ere the
statute plainly says that the corporation shall list its property; and in equally plain
terms it provides that, where it is required to do so, the stockholder shall not be
required to list his shares for taxation."); see also Louisville & Evansville Mail Co.,
88 Ky. at 78-79 ("The main question is whether the specific property of the
corporation, consisting of steamboats, or the stock held by its members, was,
during the years mentioned, required to be listed and made subject to taxation
7 See Commonwealth v. Walsh's Trustee, 106 S.W. 240 (Ky. 1907) ("Walsh's
Trustee I"), rev'don rehr'g, 117 S.W. 398 (Ky. 1909).
38 See id. at 240.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id.; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
42 See Walsh's Trustee I, 106 S.W. at 240-41 ("Manifestly the meaning of the
statute and the obvious intention of the General Assembly was to recognize the rule
that the shares of stock in a corporation were subject to taxation, and should pay
10591997-98]
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The court concluded that the exemption in section 4088 was ambiguous as
to the situation presented,43 and ultimately determined that the General
Assembly meant the exemption to apply only when substantially all of the
corporation's property was taxed by the state, so as to avoid imposing a
double tax by taxing the shares of stock when "all the property of the
corporation was in Kentucky, and the taxes paid thereon in Kentucky."
The Kentucky Supreme Court also believed that the stockholder's
interpretation of the exemption violated section 171 of the Kentucky
Constitution, 5 which mandated that property within the state territorial
limits be uniformly taxed unless specifically exempted by the
Constitution.' No constitutional exemption applied to shares of stock.47
The court stated that "if [the General Assembly] intended to require only
a small part of the personal property subjecf to taxation to be assessed, as
in this case 1 per cent, it clearly had not the power to do it ......
their proportion of revenue to the state.").
43 See id.
I See id. at 241. The Kentucky Supreme Court's interpretation of this "ambig-
uous" statute was used by the Ohio Supreme Court and ultimately the United States
Supreme Court in construing an Ohio stock exemption "which in substance and
effect are the same as our statutes on the subject," to apply only where all or
substantially all of the corporate property is taxed by the state. Id. (discussing
Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511 (1885)).
41 See id. at 242.
46 See id. Section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution states, "Taxes shall be
levied and collected for public purposes only and shall be uniform upon all
property of the same class subject to taxation within the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax; and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general
laws."
41 See id. Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution provides an exclusive list
of property exempted from taxation. The Kentucky Supreme Court interpreted the
interplay of sections 170 and 171 as clearly imposing a limit on the General
Assembly's power to exempt otherwise taxable property. See id.
48 Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court's construction of the statute may have been
guided by the General Assembly's apparent rejection of a proposal to amend the
exemption in a manner consistent with the stockholder's argument in Walsh's
Trustee L A special legislative committee recommended that section 4088 of the
Kentucky Statutes be amended to expressly apply to shares in foreign corporations
where the corporation pays taxes on its property in either Kentucky or the state of
its incorporation. The reasons given for the committee's suggestion were:
A certificate of stock represents in reality an interest in the property owned
by the corporation which has been taxed in the hands and in the name of the
corporation ....
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Next, in Commonwealth v. Ledman,49 which followed Walsh 's Trustee
I by less than a week, 0 the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed whether
the exemption for shares in non-franchise corporations applied to foreign
corporations "where all of their property is in the state of Kentucky."5'
Despite finding the exemption ambiguous as to the issue, the court
concluded the exemption did apply and that its decision was mandated by
the uniformity-of-taxation clause embodied in the Kentucky Constitution
and the impetus to avoid double taxation in the face of an ambiguous
statute.52
The losing shareholder in Walsh s Trustee I petitioned the court for
rehearing, and in Walsh's Trustee II, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed
its earlier judgment and ruled in favor of the shareholder.53 The court noted
that the franchise tax taxed the corporation's intangible property (including
capital) employed in Kentucky54 and interpreted the taxation and exemp-
tion scheme adopted by the General Assembly as evidencing its aim to
avoid imposing the same tax twice on the same "thing" as well as the same
Foreign corporations pay taxes on all property owned [sic] to the States in
which they may have been created. Each individual stockholder contributes
something towards the payment of this tax, his contribution being the
proportion to the number of shares the stock held by him, in that his
dividend or profit is decreased by the taxes paid. To compel the resident
holder to pay taxes to this State on such stock held by him clearly imposed
upon him a double taxation burden and decreases to the extent of the second
burden the earning capacity of his investment.
... If a resident holder of stock in a foreign corporation is required to
pay taxes on the same investment twice, first to the State creating the
corporation, and second, to the State of his residence, the State through a
mere fiction unjustly places its own citizens at a disadvantage by limiting
them in the field of investments and by decreasing the fair return on their
investments.
SpecialLegislative CommitteeSits Here, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington,
Ky.), Nov. 18, 1905, at 1. The absence of legislative action on this proposal two
years later may have suggested to the Kentucky Supreme Court that the General
Assembly did not support this view.
" Commonwealth v. Ledman, 106 S.W. 247 (Ky. 1907).
so See id.51 Id. at 250.
52 See id. Section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution mandates the principle of
uniform taxation. See supra note 46.
3 See Walsh's Trustee II, 117 S.W. 398 (Ky. 1909).
14 See id. at 399.
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property."5 The court concluded that the General Assembly believed that
the corporation's intangible capital stock and each shareholder's interest in
it, while separate and distinct property, were representative of the same
thing.
5 6
The court then addressed its previous determination in Walsh 's Trustee
I that the stockholder's construction would result in an unconstitutional
exemption of taxable property created solely by the General Assembly.57
It determinedthatthe exemption technicallywas not an exemption. Instead,
the entire taxing scheme represented the General Assembly's proper
exercise of its discretionary authority to tax the full thing once - the
corporation's tangible and intangible property - rather than separately and
individually taxing the various property interests (that is, the corporation's
capital stock and the shareholders' shares). 8 Considering the clear
' See id. The Kentucky Supreme Court backed away from the double taxation
characterization it set out in Walsh's Trustee L See supra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text. In Walsh s Trustee /, the court defined classic double taxation
as "taxing the same property twice in the same year for the same purpose." Walsh's
Trustee H, 117 S.W. at 399. Walsh 's Trustee landlI did not involve classic double
taxation, as the corporation's capital stock (part of its intangible property) and the
stockholders' individual shares in that capital stock were considered separate and
distinct property. See id. However, the apparition of double taxation was raised if
the same thing, though technically not the same property, was taxed twice in the
same year for the same purpose:
A corporation owns land. All its capital is invested in the land. The
corporation owns its capital stock. The shareholders own each their share
of capital stock. Each is property. Yet, there is but one thing. When the
thing itself is taxed at its full value, every element of it is made to bear the
tax. The whole includes all its parts. When the state lays a tax upon the
whole, it has made each of its constituent parts contribute to the support of
the government.
Id. The court described both types of double taxation as "oppressive" and as
working "an inequality that is fundamentally vicious," and interpreted the taxing
scheme as evidencing the General Assembly's attempt to avoid such results. Id.
56 See id.
s' See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
s See Walsh's Trustee 11, 117 S.W. at 399-401:
While... the General Assembly is prohibited from exempting any property
from taxation not specifically exempted by section 170 of the Constitution,
it is not required that every phase of property shall be taxed .... While it
would be permissible without double taxation as that term is used to tax the
corporation upon its capital, and the shareholder upon his share . ...
whether the state should resort to that form, or to the simpler one of taxing
1062 [VOL. 86
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language of the exemption and the perceived motivations of the General
Assembly in adopting this taxing scheme, the Kentucky Supreme Court
upheld the exemption and ruled it was not limited to situations where
substantially all of the corporate property was located and taxed in
Kentucky. 9 In 1912, the court extended this holding to the exemption from
taxation for shares in non-franchise corporationsP°
once and at full value the thing which represents the various properties
based upon it, is a matter of legislative discretion .... The Legislature might
have directed the constituents of the franchise to have been assessed
separately, as for example, its capital, its surplus, its choses in action. But
it has seen proper, instead to group these things into one, and tax the sum.
Id. at 399.
" See supra note 28. In considering this system and the exemption employed,
the Kentucky Supreme Court noted:
In truth the very requirements of the statutes regulating the proportion of the
franchise that is deemed as being owned in Kentucky shows that the
Legislature contemplated that any part of it might be owned and enjoyed
beyond the jurisdiction of this state, and that the purpose was to tax that
only which was here, and that in every instance, without exception, where
the fianchise and property tax is paid by the corporation, that that settled the
bill, and the shareholder need not bother about it.
Walsh's Trustee 1, 117 S.W. at 401. The essential holding of Walsh's Trustee HI
was later reaffirmed by the court in Commonwealth v. Harris, 118 S.W. 294 (Ky.
1909) (holding where public service corporation pays its franchise and property
taxes the stock is not assessed in the hands of the shareholders).
61 See Commonwealth v. Fidelity Trust Co., 143 S.W. 1037 (Ky. 1912). The
corporation in Fidelity Trust Co. was a foreign, non-franchise corporation with
substantial property outside of Kentucky that had properly listed and paid taxes on
all its property in Kentucky. See id. at 1038. The Kentucky Supreme Court noted
that it had previously held the section 4085 exemption for shares in non-franchise
corporations to apply when all of the foreign corporation's property was located
and taxed in Kentucky. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing
Commonwealth v. Ledman, 106 S.W. 247 (Ky. 1907)). The court furthernoted that
any inference inLedman that the exemption required that all of the property of the
corporation be located in Kentucky was incorrect and, relying on the analogous
case of Walsh's Trustee II, the court held the exemption applied if the corporation
paid taxes on all of its property within Kentucky even if it had substantial property
elsewhere. See Fidelity Trust Co., 143 S.W. at 1039.
In addition, the court questioned the wisdom of the Commonwealth's argument
that the exemption was intended to apply only when substantially all of the
corporate property was taxed in Kentucky:
The construction claimed [by the Commonwealth] would mean that the
Kentucky [corporation], in order that its shares might not be a separate
1997-98] 1063
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In 1917, however, the General Assembly expressed its displeasure with
the result in Walsh's Trustee II and its progeny by consolidating the
exemption for shares of stock in a franchise corporation and the exemption
for shares in a non-franchise corporation into one provision. The new
provision exempted shares held by a resident shareholder in any corpora-
tion that had one-fourth of its total property in Kentucky if the corporation
paid the taxes on such property (including the franchise tax if applicable).6'
In 1924, the General Assembly further restricted the exemption's availabil-
ity by requiring that at least three-fourths of the corporation's total property
be located and taxed within Kentucky.62 No reported case addressed the
exemption after the 1917 amendments; however, the 1924 amendments
resulted in significant litigation.
In the 1926 case of Shrinkle's Estate v. Kenton County Board of
Supervisors,63 the taxing authority attempted to tax the estate of a resident
shareholder for shares in a domestic corporation that had less than half its
property located and taxed in Kentucky.64 After tracing each of the
amendments to the stock exemption, the Kentucky Supreme Court
subject of taxation, must restrict its operations, or rather its property
holdings, entirely to the state, and thus be denied the opportunities which
thrift and enterprise might give to it by establishing itself in other states as
well.
Id. The court also relied on Walsh's Trustee II to refute the Commonwealth's
argument that the exemption was unconstitutional as a legislative exemption of
property from taxation. See id. at 1040.
Three years later the Kentucky Supreme Court confronted a situation in which
a resident shareholder had directed a non-franchise corporation to hold some
property in Kentucky and pay the taxes on it so as to exempt her shares from
taxation. See Slater v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W. 201,203 (Ky. 1915). The court
found, however, that the exemption applied only when the property was "acquired
in good faith, and for the corporate use and purposes." Id.
6 See KY. STAT. § 4088 (Carroll 1918). The burden of proof rested with the
shareholder to show that one-fourth of the corporation's total property was located
and taxed in Kentucky. See id.
62 See id. § 4088 (Carroll 1930). This statute essentially was worded the same
way as the modem version of the stock exemption (K.R.S. § 136.010), which
existed in substantially the same form for approximately 70 years. The modem
statute referred to an exemption from ad valorem taxes and also exempted U.S. and
Kentucky government obligations from the calculation of the corporation's total
property. See K.R.S. § 136.030(1) (Michie Supp. 1996); see also supra note 28.
63 Shrinkle's Estate v. Kenton County Bd. of Supervisors, 287 S.W. 209 (Ky.
1926).
64 See id. at 209.
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determined that the General Assembly had exercised its discretion to tax
both the corporation on its property within the state (including its fran-
chise) and the resident on his shares in the corporation unless three-fourths
of the corporation's total property was located and taxed in Kentucky.6"
Thus, the exemption did not apply.6 6 In summarily disposing of the various
double taxation and constitutional arguments made by the shareholder's
estate, the court noted that it was well-settled that the General Assembly
could tax both the property of the corporation and the property of the
shareholders without violating the state or federal Constitution.
67
In the 1927 case ofSier v. Board ofSupervisors,68 a shareholder made
a more developed argument for invalidating the stock exemption. The
shareholder argued that not taxing shares in corporations with seventy-five
percent of their property in Kentucky, but taxing shares in corporations
with less than seventy-five percent of their property in Kentucky, was
discriminatory under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.69 The Kentucky Supreme
65 See id. at 209-10.
6 See id. at 209.
67 See id. at 210. The estate of the shareholder argued that the General Assem-
bly had violated the Kentucky constitutional prohibition against double taxation,
as well as the federal Constitution's prohibition against the taking of the
shareholder's property without due process of law. See id. at 209. The estate also
argued that double taxation discriminated against the estate, presumably because
the shareholder was taxed on his investments while other shareholders in
corporations with at least 75% of their corporate property located in Kentucky
would not be so taxed. The Kentucky Supreme Court summarily disposed of all
these arguments by reiterating the principle that the capital of the corporation and
shares in the corporation are separate and distinct property. See id. at 210 (stating
that the Commonwealth may tax "'the franchise, which includes the capital of the
corporation, and [may also tax] the shareholderupon his shares,' "Walsh's Trustee
II, 117 S.W. 398,400 (Ky. 1909)). Unlike the stock exemption in Walsh's Trustee
H, the section 4088 exemption in Shrinkle's Estate unmistakably evidenced the
General Assembly's intent to tax both the corporation and the shareholder except
in the exempted situation. See Shrinkle's Estate, 287 S.W. at 210.
68 Siler v. Board of Supervisors, 298 S.W. 189 (Ky. 1927).
69 See id. at 191-92. The other argument presented by the shareholder was that
the assessment of the shares at their full value was not a fair and uniform valuation,
since the county valued property at only 70% of its full value for assessment
purposes. See id. at 190. By 1927, Kentucky had amended section 171 of the
Kentucky Constitution to allow the General Assembly to classify property for
taxation purposes and declare what property would be subject to local taxation. See
id. Section 4019A-10 of the Kentucky Statutes put intangibles in one class and
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Court examined other line-drawing techniques employed by Kentucky and
other states in taxation and other areas and noted that all had survived
similar equal protection challenges, even those that reached the United
States Supreme Court.70 It thus concluded that this line-drawing did not
constitute unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause. 1
Two years after Siler, another challenge to the stock exemption reached
Kentucky's highest court. In Klein v. Jefferson County Board of Tax
Supervisors,72 a resident shareholder held stock in aNew Jersey corporation
that had only one-fourth of its total property located and taxed in Kentucky,
and the shares had been assessed at their fair cash value.73 The court again
applied a different tax rate to that property. See id. It also exempted intangibles
from local taxation. See id. By this statute, Whitley County was exempted from
taxing intangibles; therefore, any undervaluation of property by the county did not
in and of itself ameliorate the fair and uniform assessment of intangibles
throughout Kentucky. See id. at 191. The shareholder had failed to demonstrate that
the undervaluation was so "continuous, persistent, and uniform" as to evidence a
scheme by the Commonwealth to allow such undervaluation so that the shareholder
would have a colorable claim of discrimination and nonuniformity when his shares
were taxed at their full value. See id. at 190-91.
70 See id. Some of the cases the Kentucky Supreme Court relied on involved
a forfeiture of land that occurred because the owners had not properly recorded the
land for taxation purposes for five consecutive years, an exemption from Kentucky
ad valorem taxation on telephone companies if gross receipts were less than $500,
and an exemption of railroads less than 50 miles in length from passenger car
heating regulations. See id. Since this discrimination is in the social and economic
arena, and so would not likely be construed to implicate a fundamental interest or
discriminate against a suspect class, the court correctly applied the rational basis
test and stated with respect to the protections afforded the taxpayer under the Equal
Protection Clause:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution is not a protection
in all cases against unwise state legislation. It imposes no fixed rule of
taxation upon the states. It protects against such discrimination as amounts
to a denial of the equal protection of the law or deprivation of property
without due process of law.
Id. at 191.
71 See id. at 191-92.
72 Klein v. Jefferson County Bd. of Tax Supervisors, 18 S.W.2d 1009 (Ky.
1929), aff'd, 282 U.S. 19 (1930).
3 See id. at 1010. As in Siler v. Board of Supervisors, the shareholder argued
that land in the county was assessed at only 70% of its sale value and that assessing
his shares at their full sale value violated the uniformity of taxation mandated by
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rejected the charge that this line-drawing, by which shares of corporations
are taxed only if less than seventy-five percent of their property is in
Kentucky, violated the Equal Protection Clause, concluding that given the
two extremes of not taxing shares in corporations with no taxable property
in Kentucky and taxing shares in corporations with all or substantially all
of their taxable property in Kentucky, the General Assembly had made a
reasonable compromise.74
In 1930, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Kentucky
Supreme Court's judgment in Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors.' The
Court reiterated that shareholders and the corporation may both be taxed,
though it is not unconstitutional to choose otherwise.76 It further noted that
to exempt shares from taxation when most or all of the corporation's
property was assessed in the state would clearly be "just," though not
required, and it found that the line drawn by the Kentucky General
Assembly was a reasonable attempt to effectuate that result.77 The Court
also dismissed the shareholder's argument that the corporation was a mere
the Kentucky Constitution. See id. at 1011. The Kentucky Supreme Court
dismissed this argument by noting that shares in a corporation and land were
different types of property. See id. In addition, the assessment of real estate at 70%
reflected the county assessment board's judgment that most land was purchased on
credit and thus the actual sale price exceeded that for an all-cash sale. See id. The
court also noted that the shares were only subject to state taxation, not local
taxation (a burden that was borne, however, by real estate) and concluded that the
classification was "just and reasonable, and [was] clearly such a discrimination as
the best interests of society requires." Id. at 1012.
' See id. at 1011-12. The fact that the General Assembly could have taxed
resident shareholders' shares in any corporation irrespective of the location of its
taxable property does not mean that failing to tax such shareholders results in
discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause. See id. (discussing and
quoting Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 49 S. Ct. 188, 188 (1929)).
5 Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19 (1930).
76 See id. at 23. The Court provided one clue to why shares in a corporation and
the corporation's property are different: only the value of the former is affected by
rumors. See id.
" See id. The Court indicated that this case involved "the usual question of
degree and of drawing a line where no important distinction can be seen between
the nearest points on two sides, but where the distinction between the extremes is
plain." Id. The Court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that if 90% was
reasonable, then 75% must be as well. The lower court believed that the 75%
requirement was intended to allow some flexibility so that if only a fraction of a
percent of the corporation's property was located outside Kentucky, the
shareholder would not lose the exemption. See Klein, 18 S.W.2d at 1011.
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fiction and that taxation of the shareholder's shares would result in taxing
property beyond the state's boundaries if the shares were taxed at their full
value, rather than at a percentage reflecting the ratio of the corporate
property located in the state to total corporate property. 8
These cases represent the only challenges to Kentucky's intangibles tax
until the St. Ledger case.79 This historical backdrop provides an understand-
ing of how the exemption developed into its present incarnation. Kentucky,
however, was not the only state wrestling with an intangibles tax and its
application to shares of stock in a corporation.
B. Other States' Experiences Applying an Intangibles Tax to Shares of
Stock
Other states also grappled with the application of an intangibles or
property tax to shares of stock and exemptions for investment holdings in
in-state companies. Many of the cases that explored this issue were decided
in the early part of the century, and most involved a resident shareholder
challenging the state's taxation of his shares of stock in a foreign corpora-
tion or a corporation with little or no property or business within the state."0
78 See Klein, 282 U.S. at 24. The Court agreed that the corporation may
theoretically be a fiction; however, this fiction is treated in the law as if it were a
real person and therefore its ownership in property cannot be attributed to its
shareholders. The Court stated, "The principle ofjustice that leads to the exemption
that has been dealt with could not be insisted upon as a matter of constitutional
right and it is reasonable for the legislature to confine it to well marked cases,
rather than press it to a logical extreme." Id.
The shareholder's argument of lack of uniformity in taxation was also
dismissed by the Court, which stated, "There is nothing in the Fourteenth
Amendment that requires land and stock to be taxed at the same rate or by the same
tests .... "Id.
71 It should be remembered that at the turn of the century and in the early
1900s, the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the dormant Commerce
Clause and its impact on state action that discriminates against interstate commerce
was not fully developed. Challenges to intangibles taxation and related exemptions
based on the dormant Commerce Clause are analyzed in Part ll.B, infra.
80 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. City of Atlanta, 110 S.E. 730, 736 (Ga. 1922)
(upholding Georgia's taxation of residents' shares in foreign corporation even
though shares in domestic corporations were exempt from taxation); In re
Greenleaf, 56 N.E. 295, 296 (Ill. 1900) (concluding Illinois statutes required
resident to list his shares in foreign corporations for taxation despite an exemption
for shares in domestic corporations, the property of which was taxed by Illinois);
1068 [VOL. 86
ST. LEDGER v. KENTUCKYREVENUE CABINET
The most common argument against the imposition of a tax on shares
ofstock was that such taxation constituted imp ermissible double taxation.$'
This argument took a variety of similar forms. Some shareholders argued
that shares of stock were mere representations of the shareholder's claim
on the corporation's property. 82 Others argued the shares derived their
value solely from the underlying assets of the corporation.83 The arguments
Judy v. Beckwith, 114 N.W. 565 (Iowa 1908) (concluding Iowa statutes required
resident to list his shares in a foreign corporation for taxation despite various
exemptions, including one for shares in domestic manufacturing corporations the
property of which was taxed in kind by Iowa); State v. Nelson, 119 N.W. 1058,
1060 (Minn. 1909) (upholding Minnesota statutes that expressly taxed residents on
shares in foreign corporations while exempting from taxation shares in domestic
corporations); Rehkopfv. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 141 N.W.2d
462,470 (Neb. 1966) (upholding Nebraska's intangibles tax scheme, where shares
in a foreign corporation were assessed at a substantial value for taxation purposes
and shares in domestic corporations were assessed at a miniscule value).
Many of the statutes involved in the cited cases differ from Kentucky's stock
exemption in that the latter is not based on the domestic-versus-foreign distinction.
The basic assumption, however, remains the same:
The classification in Georgia, whereby the shares of certain domestic
corporations are exempt from taxation, and the shares of corporations of
other states are liable for taxation, is based upon the assumption that, as a
general rule, the assets of domestic corporations are located within this
state, and will be returned for taxation, and that the assets of corporations
of other states are located without, and are not liable for taxation in this
state.
Coca-Cola Co., 110 S.E. at 736.
SI See, e.g., Greenleaf, 56 N.E. at 295 (shareholders alleged that taxation of
their shares in foreign corporations with no property in the state constituted double
taxation); Judy, 114 N.W. at 565 (same); Nelson, 119 N.W. at 1060 (same).
82 See, e.g., Greenleaf, 56 N.E. at 295 (shareholder argued that shares were
"mere tokens or evidence of the owner's relative interest in the tangible property
owned by the corporation"); Judy, 114 N.W. at 567 (shareholders alleged that
shares of stock could only in a "very limited and qualified sense.., be classified
as personal property, and are rather merely written evidence" of the shareholder's
ownership interest in the property of the corporation).
83 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co., 110 S.E. at 735 (noting that shares of stock have
no "inherent value"); Rehkopf, 141 N.W.2d at 468 (same). But see, e.g., Klein v.
Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 23 (1930) (noting that the value of shares
in a corporation can be affected by rumors and investor expectations, though the
underlying value of the corporate assets cannot similarly be affected).
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ultimately boiled down to the claim that shares of stock simply were not
property.84
The courts regularly rejected these arguments and held that shares of
stock were property in their own right despite their "peculiar qualities and
characteristics" and "intangible" nature.85 The courts often alluded to
various characteristics that supported their conclusions that shares of stock
were in fact personal property. These characteristics included the
shareholder's power to invoke the state's authority to recover the stock
when wrongfully taken or lost,86 the shares' ability to be the subject of
contracts, purchases, or sales, 7 and the ability of the shares to pass through
testacy by bequeath or intestacy by distribution. 8 In short, shares of stock
"have all the qualities of every other character of property ..... 9
The shareholders also argued that double taxation existed because the
corporate property and the shares of stock were in fact the same propertyf0
The courts repeatedly applied the separate-and-distinct theory to refute this
type of argument.91 The theory posits that the corporation, though a legal
fiction, is a person under the law and therefore the owner of the tangible
property; the shareholder is the owner only of the shares and while they
represent claims on the corporation's tangible property, they do not
represent the ownership of it.92 The courts showed little sympathy for the
84 Cf Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 215-19 (1920) (holding that a tax on
a totally proportionate stock dividend was not a tax on income because the taxpayer
had not derived anything from the dividend; that is, the dividend had not been
severed from the taxpayer's investment and drawn by him).
85 Judy, 114 N.W. at 567 (noting the "entire unanimity in classifying shares of
stock in a corporation as personal property").
86 See id.; Greenleaf, 56 N.E. at 296.
87 See Rehkopf, 141 N.W.2d at 468.
88 See id.; Judy, 114 N.W. at 567.
89 Rehkopf, 141 N.W.2d at 468.
90 See, e.g., Greenleaf, 56 N.E. at 295 (shareholder argued that taxing the stock
was merely "taxing the tangible property a second time").
1 See, e.g., Judy, 114 N.W. at 567 (noting that the corporation's capital stock
and the shareholder's share thereof are different property rights); Greenleaf, 56
N.E. at 295 (stating "tangible property of a corporation and the shares of stock
therein are separate and distinct kinds of property").
92 Consider this discussion in Judy v. Beckwith:
A shareholder and the corporation are two distinct persons. Their rights and
interests with relation to the property and business are distinct and
severable. The corporation is the sole owner of such property, while a share
of the capital stock simply entitles the holder to demand his just proportion
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plight of shareholders, particularly when their double taxation argument
stemmed from the fact that another state, different from the one taxing their
stock, had taxed the corporation's tangible property. 3 The separate-and-
distinct theory successfully and repeatedly dismantled the foundation of
any double taxation argument advanced by shareholders.
The shareholders also argued that the legislatures' disparate, and in
their view discriminatory, classification of them and their shares as
contrasted with shareholders and shares that were exempted from taxation
constituted a violation of both the state and the federal Constitutions.94 The
of dividends, and, when the corporation is dissolved, to also demand his like
proportion of the remnant of assets.
Judy, 114 N.W. at 567; see also Greenleaf, 56 N.E. at 295 (noting that the tangible
property of the corporation and the shares "belong to different owners - the first
being the property of the artificial person, the corporation; the latter the individual
owner thereof").
I This case presents the weakest double taxation argument, since not only does
the separate-and-distinct property theory negate the finding that the same property
has been taxed twice, but the fact that another state taxes the corporate property
negates any finding that the same property has been taxed twice by the same taxing
authority or government. Consider the Iowa Supreme Court's response to just such
a shareholder claim:
Each state is sovereign within its own territorial jurisdiction, and its power
to tax any and all property therein, except such as is in actual transit through
it, cannot be taken away, limited, or lessened by the act of the taxing
authorities of any other state .... When a state finds property within its
jurisdiction, it is not necessary, before taxing it, to investigate and ascertain
whether any other state has taxed it or asserts the right so to do; and if it
happens that two or more jurisdictions have levied a tax upon the same item
or description of property for the same period it is not double taxation
within the condemnation of the law. A double taxation, obnoxious to the
rule, is where the second or additional burden is imlosed by the same
sovereignty which imposed the first.
Judy, 114 N.W. at 568; see also State v. Nelson, 119 N.W. 1058, 1060 (Minn.
1909) (stating the "tax laws of other states have no extraterritorial force").
9' See Coca-Cola Co. v. City ofAtlanta, 110 S.E. 730,736 (Ga. 1922) (alleging
disparate classification violated uniformity of taxation and the Equal Protection
Clause); Rehkopf, 141 N.W.2d at 466 (stockholder alleging shares in corporations
were one class of property that must be taxed uniformly); Nelson, 119 N.W. at
1060 (alleging same disparate classification violates state constitutional provisions
mandating uniformity and equality of taxation); Judy, 114 N.W. at 569 (alleging
classification of shares in domestic corporation different than that of foreign
corporations violated state constitutional requirement that "all laws must have
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shareholders typically alleged that the classification drawn by the
legislatures ran afoul of state constitutional provisions requiring uniform
taxation and the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution.95
Neither argument persuaded the courts, which routinely held the disparate
classifications were reasonable as drawn by the legislatures. 6 The Equal
Protection Clause challenges were particularly weak, since the shareholders
were not part of a suspect class and the statutes did not impinge upon a
uniform operation").
11 See supra note 94.
96 In Rehkopf, the Supreme Court of Nebraska relied heavily on Kidd v.
Alabama, 188 U.S. 730 (1903) (involving Alabama's taxation of shares of stock
in foreign but not domestic railroad companies), which ruled against the
shareholder's equal protection claim:
"We say that the state in taxing stock may take into account the fact that the
property and franchises of the corporation are untaxed, whereas in other
cases they are taxed; and we say untaxed, because they are not taxed by the
state in question. The real grievance in a case like the present is that, more
than probably, they are taxed elsewhere.... No doubt it would be a great
advantage to the county and to the individual states if principles of taxation
could be agreed upon which did not conflict with each other, and a common
scheme could be adopted by which taxation of substantially the same
property in two jurisdictions could be avoided. But the Constitution of the
United States does not go so far."
Rehkopf, 141 N.W.2d at 469 (quoting Kidd, 188 U.S. at 730).
As to state constitution uniformity requirements, the courts have shown great
deference to the state legislatures. Even when the assumptions behind the
classification might not hold true, the classifications were not invalidated. See, e.g.,
Coca-Cola Co., 110 S.E. at 736 (noting that the fact that a foreign corporation will
not always have all of its property out of the state, nor will a domestic corporation
have all of its property in the state, does not invalidate a classification based on that
assumption).
In State v. Nelson, the Supreme Court of Minnesota said on this issue:
In the case of a stockholder in a domestic corporation, he is taxed in this
state on his interest in the corporation when the corporation pays the tax on
its property; but in the case of a foreign corporation, a resident holder of its
stock is not and cannot be taxed in this state on his interest in the property
of such corporation, except by taxing therein his shares of stock. The result
is that each of such stockholders is taxed once, and once only, on his
property within the state, and that the statute, eliminating the laws and acts
of taxing officers of other states, is equal and uniform in its operation as to
persons and property within the state.
Nelson, 119 N.W. at 1060.
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fundamental interest.97 Resident holders of shares that were not exempted
thus faced an insurmountable obstacle in the early part of this century when
challenging exemptions on the grounds that such exemptions did not extend
to the shares held by them.
C. The Motivations for Imposing an Intangibles Tax and Providing
Exemptions for Stock in "Local" Corporations
Given the considerable judicial deference to the legislative line-
drawing in this area, the question arises as to what motivated state
legislatures to draw the lines where they did. Some of the motivating
factors proved consequential to the continued existence of these taxation
schemes.
Intangibles constitute a form ofpersonal property and their taxation can
produce significant revenues - the most basic driving force of any tax."
Although most states that tax intangibles, such as shares of stock, tax them
under the separate-and-distinct-property theory," a majority of the states
have refused to tax intangibles altogether."° Those states, like Kentucky,
9 See supra note 74.
9 In the St. Ledger cases, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet argued that Kentucky
would lose $30 million per year in revenue if the entire intangibles tax was
declared unconstitutional. See Tom Loftus, Kentucky Tax on Stocks Struck Down,
Supreme Court Limits Refunds State Must Pay, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville,
Ky.), Jan. 31, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Loftus, Kentucky Tax on Stocks Struck
Down].
19 See supra note 25. "There may be sound reasons for this type of double
taxation in view of the differences in ownership of the securities and the underlying
property, the advantages of incorporation, and the concentration of wealth in
corporations and their security holders." HELLERSTEIN&HELLERSTEIN, supra note
27, at 204.
"0 The problems created by an intangibles tax probably account for the large
number of states' refusal to tax intangibles:
A property tax on intangibles frequently results in substance in a second
layer tax on underlying real and tangible personal property, which is itself
subject to the same levy....
The virtually insuperable difficulties in ferreting out intangibles by the
tax collector, the double taxation problem, and other considerations have
caused many fiscal authorities to urge that intangibles be withdrawn from
ad valorem taxation altogether, a recommendation which more than a third
of the States have adopted. In other States specific intangibles such as bank
deposits, mortgages secured by taxed domestic property, and securities of
corporations which are otherwise taxed by the State have been exempted
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that have taxed intangibles have often created exemptions for shares of
stock in what might be described as "local" corporations - domestic
corporations or corporations that have most of their property locatedwithin
the taxing state."'
The impetus for such exemptions has to some extent been the
legislative desire to avoid the creation of a double burden by the same
taxing authority.02 Taxing the corporation on its property affects the
returns the shareholders receive by reducing the assets available for
dividend andresidual distribution.0 3 Taxing the shareholders separately on
their shares further diminishes their investment return. 14 While clearly less
sympathetic when at least one of the burdens has been imposed by another
state, the legislatures through these exemptions have attempted to alleviate
this perceived injustice when both burdens are imposed by the resident
shareholder's state.
The idea that shareholders should bear only their fair share of the
"public burden" also appears to have been a motivating factor for these
exemptions. 05 If most or all of the corporate property is located and taxed
within the state, the legislatures likely believed that the corporation and its
resident shareholders had paid their requisite share of the costs for the
benefits and protections they receive from the taxing state.10 6
Lurking underneath the surface, however, was a third moti-
vating factor for such exemptions: state protection and isolation of
truly "local" corporations. 7 Taxation of the shares affects investor
from the property tax.
HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 27, at 204-05.
101 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
102 See supra note 48.
103 See supra note 48.
1o' See supra note 48. While the separate-and-distinct theory eliminates the
charge of double taxation, the public perception of double taxation still may be
significant given the intangible nature of shares of stock and the fact that they
derive most of their value from the underlying assets of the corporation.
" See Klein v. Jefferson County Bd. of Tax Supervisors, 18 S.W.2d 1009,
1011 (Ky. 1929).
106 See id. Presumably the shareholder's share would be represented by the
reduced return he receives because all of the corporation's property is taxed.
107 It should be noted that the effects of this factor were labeled by the
Kentucky Supreme Court as "unjust" when the government argued that the original
Kentucky stock exemption for non-franchise corporations was intended to apply
only where substantially all of the corporate property was located in Kentucky,
despite the statute's language to the contrary:
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choices. 0 8 "Local" corporations become more attractive to resident
investors than "non-local" corporations by virtue of the tax break offered
on such investments.0 9 "Local" corporations therefore received an
The construction demanded by the commonwealth, therefore, would lead
us to the position that, if aKentucky manufacturing or trading nonfranchise
corporation were, at any time, in the pursuit of its lawful business, to
become the holder of any considerable property outside of the state of
Kentucky, the holders of its shares of stock would at once have to list same
for taxation; whereas, if the corporation should confine its property
holdings entirely to Kentucky, its shareholders would not need to list their
shares, nor submit to a tax upon them. The Legislature can hardly have
meant to create so unjust a condition. The construction claimed would mean
that the Kentucky plant, in order that its shares might not be a separate
subject of taxation, must restrict its operations, or rather its property
holdings, entirely to the state, and thus be denied the opportunities which
thrift and enterprise might give to it by establishing itself in other states as
well.
Commonwealth v. Fidelity Trust Co., 143 S.W. 1037, 1039 (Ky. 1912); see also
supra note 60. Ironically, the General Assembly amended the exemptions soon
thereafter to achieve the construction that so appalled the Kentucky Supreme Court.
See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
108 The Supreme Court of Kentucky noted the effect of Kentucky's exemption
upon investor choice:
First, a potential stockholder who is a Kentucky resident and is
contemplating investment in a corporation will find the stock in the
corporation whose property is primarily (75% or more) located in the state
of Kentucky more attractive than that of a corporation whose property is
primarily located outside the state. As a result, and at a minimum, the
investor has had his investment decision affected by this tax provision.
St. Ledger I, 912 S.W.2d 34, 42 (Ky. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct.
1821 (1996); see also Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 333 (1996)
(recognizing that North Carolina's method of increased taxation of shares of stock
in corporations that expand their operations beyond North Carolina affected
investor choices); Brammer, supra note 27 (quoting Herschel St. Ledger's
statement that Kentucky's intangibles tax "'improperly influences any person's
investment program' ").
'o See St. Ledgerl, 912 S.W.2d at 42. The U.S. Supreme Court in Fulton Corp.
stated with respect to North Carolina's similar intangibles tax scheme, "A regime
that taxes stock only to the degree that its issuing corporation participates in
interstate commerce favors domestic corporations over their foreign competitors
in raising capital among North Carolina residents." Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 333.
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advantage over "non-local" corporations in competing for investment
capital within the state."10
These exemptions also tended to alter "corporate decision making."'
For example, while "local" corporations might be dissuaded from
expanding outside the state or feel forced to restrict themselves to in-state
expansion for fear of losing their favored investment status in local capital
markets, so too may "non-local" corporations be persuaded to become
more "local" in order to obtain this favored status.'12
Of the three factors motivating legislatures to exempt from intangibles
taxation shares of stock in "local" corporations, the first two were the most
relevant and instructive in the early cases that dealt with and ultimately
upheld such exemptions. However, the third motivating factor - state
isolationism and protectionism - ultimately proved to be the decisive
factor.
110 The Kentucky Supreme Court noted:
Companies interested in raising capital through the issuance of stock shares
are having potential investors' decision-making processes affected by this
legislation. Companies paying taxes to the state of Kentucky for 75% or
more of their property will become more "investment attractive" than those
companies that do not....
... [T]his change in the manner which Kentucky residents invest funds
operates in such a way as to "provid[e] a direct commercial advantage to
local business."
St. LedgerI, 912 S.W.2d at 41-42 (quoting Northwestern States v. Minnesota, 358
U.S. 450, 459 (1959)).
"I Id. at42.
..2 See id. (raising the spectre that altering corporate decision-making in this
artificial way could lead to poor buginess decisions); Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 333
(stating such exemptions tend "to discourage domestic corporations from plying
their trades in interstate commerce"); Commonwealth v. Fidelity Trust Co., 143
S.W. 1037, 1039 (Ky. 1912) (noting the restrictive effect on corporate expansion
and growth of an exemption from intangibles taxation of shares in only "local"
businesses). But see Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves:
Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 377, 391-97 (1996) (arguing that state tax incentives are too insignificant to
have a substantial effect on business location decisions). The protection of "local"
businesses via these exemptions is just one of an immense spectra of location
incentives adopted in some form by all of the states. See id. at 386 & n.46
(providing examples of tax breaks offered in three states that "reduce capital costs
for in-state businesses by providing preferential tax treatment to investors who
provide funds to in-state businesses").
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II. DARNELL TO FULTON CORP. - STATE LAW SURVEY
OF THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE COMPENSATORY TAX DOCTRINE
AND DISCRIMINATORY STATE INTANGIBLES TAXES
As discussed earlier, states often provide tax incentives and exemptions
to benefit local businesses." 3 The Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution"' is a direct grant to Congress to regulate commerce. The
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the negative implications
of the Commerce Clause-that is, the dormant Commerce Clause- imposes
restrictions on the use of these state tax incentives because no state may
"impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce ... by
providing a direct commercial advantage to local business."' 5 However, a
tax that is otherwise discriminatory will pass constitutional scrutiny if it
can be classified as a "compensatory tax." This Part of the Note will
discuss cases in which courts struggled with the question of whether to
apply the compensatory tax doctrine.
A. General Discussion and Application of the Compensatory Tax
Doctrine
One of the most fundamental principles permeating constitutional law
is captured by the following language from Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, a
1996 United States Supreme Court Commerce Clause decision:
The constitutional provision of power "[t]o regulate Commerce...
among the several States,". . .has long been seen as a limitation on state
regulatory powers, as well as an affirmative grant of congressional
authority.... In its negative aspect, the Commerce Clause "prohibits
economic protectionism- that is, "regulatory measures designed to benefit
in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors."" 16
13 See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
114 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have power... [t]o regulate
Commerce... among the several states .... ).
"l Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 755 (1981).
16 Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996) (quoting Associated
Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994)); see also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S.
437,454-55 (1992) (noting that "[i]t is long established that, while a literal reading
evinces a grant of power to Congress, the Commerce Clause also directly limits the
power of the States to discriminate against interstate commerce"). The negative
Commerce Clause is often referred to as the dormant Commerce Clause.
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This negative aspect of the Commerce Clause, in effect, prohibits states
from facially discriminating against interstate commerce. 1
17
Courts, however, have long recognized that a facially discriminatory
tax might still survive Commerce Clause scrutiny if it is a compensatory
tax that "cure[s] the alleged discrimination."' 8 A compensatory tax is a
facially discriminatory tax on interstate commerce that compensates for an
intrastate tax, on a substantially equivalent event, so that there is an equal
burden on interstate and intrastate commerce.' 9 Thus, the compensatory
tax doctrine is "a specific way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax as
achieving a legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved through
nondiscriminatory means.""12
In Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality
Commission, 2' the United States Supreme Court set forth athree-prong test
"' See Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 325 (noting that state laws that facially dis-
criminate against interstate commerce are "'virtually per se invalid"' (quoting
Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department ofEnvtl. Quality Comm 'n, 511 U.S. 93 (1994))).
In the state taxation context, a law is treated as discriminatory if it "'tax[es] a
transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs
entirely within the State.' "Id. (quoting Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642
(1984)).
118 Walter Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional
Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW 405, 453 (1986). The United States Supreme
Court invoked the compensatory tax doctrine as early as 1869. However, there are
not very many judicial opinions considering the doctrine. See id. Hellerstein
contends that the most powerful justification for the compensatory tax doctrine is
constitutional necessity, because the doctrine allows states "to achieve tax equality
indirectly when the Constitution prohibits them achieving it directly." Id.
Administrative convenience is another common justification for the doctrine. See
id. at 454.
"' See Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 102-03; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,
300 U.S. 577, 584 (1937) (noting that a discriminatory tax will be upheld if
"[w]hen the account is made up, the stranger from afar is subject to no greater
burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the gates").
120 Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 102.
121 Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality Comm'n, 511 U.S. 93
(1994). In this case, the operators of solid waste disposal facilities asserted that
Oregon's $2.50-per-ton surcharge on the in-state disposal of solid waste generated
in other states violated the Commerce Clause. The operators complained that the
surcharge was discriminatory because only a $0.85-per-ton fee was imposed on the
disposal of waste generated within Oregon. See id. Oregon argued that the
surcharge was a compensatory tax "necessary to make shippers of such waste pay
their 'fair share' of the costs imposed on Oregon by the disposal of their waste in
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for determining whether a facially discriminatory tax could be upheld as a
compensatory tax:
To justify a charge on interstate commerce as a compensatory tax, a
State must, as a threshold matter, "identifLy] the [intrastate tax] burden for
which the State is attempting to compensate." Once that burden has been
identified, the tax on interstate commerce must be shown roughly to
approximate - but not exceed - the amount of the tax on intrastate
commerce. Finally, the events on which the interstate and intrastate taxes
are imposed must be "substantially equivalent"; that is, they must be
sufficiently similar in substance to serve as mutually exclusive "prox[ies]"
for each other.12
The Oregon Waste Systems Courtnotedthat under the first prong of the
test, general taxes, such as income taxes, could not ordinarily serve as the
intrastate burden because it would be almost impossible to determine their
amount, given that "general tax payments are often commingled with other
general revenues."''
Furthermore, the Oregon Waste Systems Court noted the difficulty in
meeting the third prong of the test-the substantially-equivalent-events test.
The high Court commented that the most "prototypical example" of
substantially equivalent taxable events is the equivalence between the
taxation of sales and use of articles of trade. In fact, this is the only
situation in which the United States Supreme Court has ever found the
existence of substantially equivalent events.'24 Taxes other than sales and
the State." Id. at 102 (quoting Respondents). The Court held that the $2.25
surcharge was discriminatory on its face and could not be justified as a
compensatory tax because Oregon had failed to identify a charge on intrastate
commerce equal to or exceeding the surcharge. See id. at 100, 104. Furthermore,
Oregon's levy of taxes on earning income and utilizing Oregon landfills did not
involve substantially equivalent events. See id. at 104-05. Therefore, the Court
found that the statute violated the Commerce Clause. See id. at 108.
' Id. at 103 (citations omitted). The most modem interpretation of this test is
discussed at infra notes 188-205 and accompanying text.
'2 Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 104.
124 See id. at 105. The Court expressed its hesitancy to "'plunge ... into the
morass of weighing comparative tax burdens' by comparing taxes on dissimilar
events."Id. (quoting TylerPipe Industries, Inc. v. Washing State Dep't ofRevenue,
483 U.S. 232,289 (1961)). One of the first and most important compensatory tax
cases was Hennefordv. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937)-the "compensatory
use tax" case. At the time of the case, the state of Washington imposed a use tax on
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use taxes have been upheld under the compensatory tax doctrine,' 25 but not
in recent years and not under the current three-prong test. The Court has
rejected substantially-equivalent-events arguments for manufacturing and
wholesaling; 126 the earning of income and the disposing of waste at Oregon
landfills;127 and the severance of natural resources from the soil and the use
of resources imported from other states. 2 1 The compensatory tax defense,
therefore; is a very narrow defense indeed.
the "privilege of using within this state any article of tangible personal property."
Id. at 580. However, the statute further provided that the use tax did not apply to
"'the use of any article of tangible personal property the sale or use of which has
already been subjected to a tax equal to or in excess of that imposed by this title
whether under the laws of this state or some other state.'" Id. at 580-81 (quoting
1935 Wash. Laws ch. 180). The Silas Mason Company argued that this Washington
use tax violated the Commerce Clause. The Court, however, rejected Silas Mason's
argument, holding that the use tax was consistent with the Commerce Clause. In
its analysis, the Court noted that"[t]he practical effect of a system thus conditioned
... must be that retail sellers in Washington will be helped to compete upon terms
of equality with retail dealers in other states who are exempt from a sales tax or any
corresponding burden." Id. at 581. The Court further remarked that "[e]quality is
the theme that runs through all the sections of the statute," id. at 583-84, and "[tihe
one pays upon one activity or incident, and the other upon another, but the sum is
the same when the reckoning is closed," id. at 584. Therefore, the use tax did not
discriminate against interstate commerce.
"z See, e.g., Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 542 (1950)
(holding that under the compensatory tax doctrine, a Maryland excise tax on motor
vehicles for which titles were issued did not violate the Commerce Clause).
126 See Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 643 (1984) (holding that since
it cannot be determined which part of a manufacturing tax is based on sales and
which part is based on manufacturing, a manufacturing tax is not a "proxy" for a
gross receipts tax); see also infra note 152.
127 See Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 105 (stressing that since in-state ship-
pers of out-of-state waste are subject to Oregon income taxes, these taxable events
are not substantially equivalent).
12 See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,758-59 (1981). At the time of the
case, Louisiana imposed a tax on the "first use" within Louisiana of any gas that
was not subject to a severance or production tax imposed by Louisiana or any other
state. The first-use tax was challenged on the basis that it discriminated against
interstate commerce. The Court agreed with this contention and rejected the state's
compensatory tax defense. Since the first-use tax had many credits and exemptions,
the Court dismissed the state's argument that the practical effect of the first-use tax
was to create equality between the tax burdens borne by gas flowing into
Louisiana, whether extracted in Louisiana or off-shore. Therefore, the
substantially-equivalent-events test was not met. See id. at 759.
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B. Application of Compensatory Tax Analysis to State Intangibles
Tax Challenges
1. Darnell v. Indiana - 1912 - The History Begins
Darnell v. Indiana29 was the first United States Supreme Court case
challenging a state intangibles tax statute ostensibly on Commerce Clause
grounds130 and applying compensatory tax doctrine. In Darnell, the state of
Indiana brought an action to collect taxes on the stock of a Tennessee
corporation. The stock was owned by Darnell, an Indiana resident. 1 '
Under the applicable Indiana statutes, the state could impose taxes on
all shares in foreign corporations, except national banks, owned by
inhabitants of the state. In addition, Indiana could levy taxes on all shares
in domestic corporations owned by state residents "when the property of
the corporations was not exempt or not taxable to the corporation itself."'32
In other words, an Indiana resident would not have had to pay taxes on
stock owned in a domestic corporation that paid property taxes to the state
of Indiana or that owned exempt property.33
Challenging the Indiana taxing scheme, Darnell asserted that the
statutes violated the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.13 4
In particular, Darnell argued before the Supreme Court of Indiana that the
tax discriminated "in favor of domestic stocks as against shares in a foreign
corporation" because "a resident owning stock in a domestic corporation
escape[d] taxation... while his next-door neighbor owning shares of stock
in a foreign corporation [was] required to pay taxes on his holdings.' '3
Concluding that the purpose of the taxing scheme was "to require all
property to contribute pro rata its share of taxes, and so far as practicable
29 Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U.S. 390 (1912).
130 One of the main issues discussed in this Part is whetherDarnell was a Com-
merce Clause case or an Equal Protection Clause case. Ultimately, it was
characterized as an equal protection case by the U.S. Supreme Court in Fulton
Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996). See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
'3' See Darnell, 226 U.S. at 397.
132 Id. The historical intangibles statutes at issue in Darnell were located in
BuRNs' ANNO. STAT. (Ind.) §§ 10143, 10233, and 10234 (1908). See Darnell, 226
U.S. at 397.
133 However, the value of the stock exceeding the value of the corporation's
tangible personal property was taxable. See Darnell, 226 U.S. at 397.
134 See id. at 397-98.




to avoid double taxation," the Supreme Court of Indiana held that "the tax
law of Indiana is not open to the charge of discrimination against stock in
foreign corporations, but imposes only just and equal burdens upon all
corporate stocks without regard to the place of incorporating or of
conducting the corporate business.., and is accordingly valid. 1 36
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Darnell again
alleged that the tax statutes violated the Commerce Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause.3' The Court, in a very short opinion, affirmed
the decision of the Indiana Supreme Court and upheld the statutes,
primarily relying on Kidd v. Alabama,'38 a 1903. equal protection
136 Id. at 774. The Indiana Supreme Court further reasoned:
Domestic corporations are taxed upon all their property .... The state, in
its discretion, might tax the shares of stock in such corporation to the
individual owners thereof residing in this state, but it would in a sense be
double taxation, and it has not been the policy of this state to do. Shares of
stock in a foreign corporation doing business in another state owned and
held by a resident of this state are taxed because they have not and cannot
be otherwise taxed by this state .... The fact that the state in which the
corporate property may be situated taxes such tangible property in no wise
affects the right of this state to tax its own inhabitants upon all their
personal property including shares of stock in such foreign corporations.
Id. Finally, the Indiana Supreme Court asserted that Darnell was in no position to
complain about his property taxes because Indiana residents enjoyed the benefits
of Indiana's schools, churches, public accommodations, and governmental
protection. See id. Interestingly, the Indiana Supreme Court did not mention the
compensatory tax doctrine. Rather, it seemed to focus more on the policy against
double taxation in justifying the allegedly discriminatory tax.
117 See Darnell, 226 U.S. at 397-98. Darnell also complained that the Indiana
statutes did not make an allowance for foreign corporations owning property taxed
within Indiana. The Court, however, dismissed this argument because the foreign
corporation at issue did not pay any property taxes to Indiana. See id. at 398.
38 Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U.S. 730,733 (1903) (holding that equal protection
of the laws is not denied by Alabama's taxation of railroad stock, because of the
exemption of stock in domestic railroads and in others that list substantially all their
property for taxation); see also supra note 96. The U.S. Supreme Court, employing
a rational basis test, concluded there was nothing that would "prevent [Alabama]
from taxing stock in some domestic corporations and leaving stock in others
untaxed on the ground that it taxes the property and franchises of the latter to an
amount that imposes indirectly a proportional burden on the stock." Kidd, 188 U.S.
at 732. Similarly, in determining whether to tax stock in foreign corporations, the
Kidd court held that Alabama could take into account whether the property and
franchise of the corporation were untaxed since, when corporations are formed in
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case. 39 The Darnell Court also noted that the way Indiana taxed "the
property of domestic corporations and the stock of foreign ones in similar
cases" was "consistent with substantial equality;"'4 ° yet the Court did not
explain its reasoning. In fact, the Court's opinion is so concise that it is
difficult to discern what it meant by using "substantial equality" language.
Although the Court relied primarily on equal protection jurisprudence in
deciding Darnell, the "substantial equality" language it employed is very
similar to the language it used much later 4' in compensatory tax
analysis. 42 Possibly, the Court viewed the intangibles tax as a compensa-
tory tax vis-a-vis the corporate property tax. As will be seen, one of the
most contentious issues in modem intangibles tax challenges was whether
Darnell was a compensatory tax case or an equal protection case.
2. Felix v. Indiana Department of State Revenue -
Darnell Lives On
After Darnell, decades passed without any specific Commerce Clause
challenges to state intangibles taxes.'43 Outside the intangibles tax area, the
other states and their property is located in other states, the only way Alabama
could tax anything was to tax the stock held within Alabama. See id. Finally, the
Court rejected the significance of the ability of other states to tax the property of
the foreign railroad corporations, and stated that "[t]he state of Alabama is not
bound to make its laws harmonize in principle with those of other states. If
property is untaxed by its laws, then for the purpose of its laws the property is not
taxed at all." Id.
19 See Darnell, 226 U.S. at 398. Specifically, the Court stated that "[tjhe case
is pretty nearly disposed of by Kidd v. Alabama, where the real matter of
complaint, that the property of the corporation presumably is taxed in Tennessee,
is answered." Id. (citation omitted).
140 Id.
14" The three-prong test of Oregon Waste Sys. was not set forth until 1994. See
supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
142 See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
113 Although there were not any Commerce Clause challenges to state intan-
gibles taxes during this period, there was a state uniformity-of-taxation and equal
protection constitutional challenge to the Nebraska intangibles tax statute in 1966.
In Rehkopfv. Board ofEqualization, 141 N.W.2d 462 (Neb. 1966), seesupra notes
80, 96, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a statute classifying the stock of a
foreign corporation in the hands of a shareholder differently from the capital stock
of a domestic corporation did not violate the constitutional provision requiring
uniformity or the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Central to the court's holding were its assumption that the
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Commerce Clause was being more broadly construed to limit the powers
of states. This broad construction of the Commerce Clause began with the
analysis of New Deal programs created during the Depression,'" and
resulted in Congress being able to regulate any activity having a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, regardless of its local or intrastate nature. 45
The dormant Commerce Clause was also being interpreted broadly to
prevent state discrimination against interstate commerce. 146
In the late 1980s, against this background of receding state power
under the Commerce Clause, vicious battles pitting the Commerce Clause
property of a corporation gives value to its shares and the importance of the policy
against double taxation. See Rehkopf, 141 N.W.2d at 467. The Nebraska Supreme
Court reasoned that since the corporation's property in Nebraska is taxed to the
corporation, the domestic corporation was the "agent for its stockholders for the
purpose of payment of any tax which may be due upon its shares of stock." Id. at
466. Therefore, a tax law "levying a tax upon the market value of shares in foreign
corporations held by citizens of this state, and not levying such a tax upon shares
of stock in a corporation in this state where the corporation has paid the full amount
of tax upon its property," is a reasonable classification and constitutional. Id. at
468. Interestingly, in 1967, the Nebraska legislature repealed the intangibles tax
statutes challenged in Rehkoph. NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-722, repealed 1967 Neb.
Laws ch. 498, § 3.
' See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, which prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of
goods produced by employees working for more than the maximum hours or for
less than the prevailing rates); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 under the Commerce
Clause because a labor stoppage of intrastate manufacturing operations would have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
"' See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938, which placed quotas on wheat, including home-grown
wheat, because the more wheat was consumed by farmers personally, the less was
bought in commerce; thus, the interstate trade in wheat was implicated and the
Commerce Clause was applicable).
146 See Boston Stock Exchange v. Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). In
Boston StockExchange, stock exchanges located outside New York challenged an
amendment to New York's transfer tax on the basis that it discriminated against
interstate commerce. See id. at 319-20. As a result of the transfer tax amendment,
out-of-state security sales were taxed more heavily than transactions involving a
sale within the state. See id. at 319. The U.S. Supreme Court held that "because it
impose[d] a greater tax liability on out-of-state sales than on in-state sales, the New
York transfer tax . . . [fell] short of the substantially even-handed treatment
demanded by the Commerce Clause." Id. at 332.
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against state intangibles taxes began to erupt, particularly in Indiana, North
Carolina, Kentucky, Georgia, and Pennsylvania. The first of these battles
occurred in Indiana in Indiana Department of State Revenue v. Felix.14 7
In Felix, the Clarkes and Felix ("Taxpayers"), investors in an out-of-
state money market fund, challenged the constitutionality of the Indiana
Intangibles Tax Act of 1933 under the Commerce Clause.148 The Taxpayers
argued that since the Indiana Intangibles Tax Act applied only to the
ownership of the intangibles of out-of-state corporations and exempted the
intangibles of Indiana entities, it facially discriminated against interstate
commerce and therefore violated the Commerce Clause.'49
The Indiana Superior Court (the trial court)" ruled that the Indiana
intangibles tax violated the state Constitution 5' and the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution because it discriminated against Indiana
residents with assets in other states.' On appeal to the Indiana
Supreme Court, the Taxpayers argued that the more recent United States
Supreme Court cases of Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty'52 and Maryland v.
"47 Indiana Dep't of State Revenue v. Felix, 571 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. 1991).
148 See id. at 288-89. The Taxpayers also contended that the intangibles tax
violated the uniformity-of-taxation requirement ofthe Indiana Constitution, butthe
Supreme Court of Indiana rejected this contention. See id. at 294-95. The Indiana
Intangibles Tax Act was historically codified at IND. CODE §§ 6-5-1-1 to 6-5-1-34.
As a result of the Felix case, however, the legislature repealed the intangibles tax
retroactive to November 10, 1988. See Pub. L. No. 80-1989, §§ 18-19, 1989 IND.
ACTS 912, 919; see also Refunds Scheduled for Some Hoosiers Who Filed Suit
Against Intangibles Tax, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 11, 1992, at B 14 (noting "the
lawsuit led to the repeal of the tax").
"I See Felix v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 502 N.E.2d 119, 199 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986). Although the Indiana Court of Appeals case did not address the
Commerce Clause issues, the Taxpayers' Commerce Clause arguments are clearly
laid out there.
IS' The Indiana Superior Court held that the tax violated the uniform taxation
provisions in article 10, section 1, of the Indiana Constitution. See Felix, 571
N.E.2d at 289.
'5' See id. at 289-93; Refunds Scheduled for Some Hoosiers, supra note 148,
at B14. This decision prompted the St. Ledger case. See Introduction, supra; Part
I, infra.
152 Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984). InArmco, Inc., the taxpayer
challenged, on Commerce Clause grounds, the constitutionality of West Virginia's
business and operation tax. This tax required persons engaged in the business of
selling tangible personal property at wholesale to pay taxes on gross receipts. Local
manufacturers were exempt from the gross receipts tax, but they did have to pay
a higher manufacturing tax. See id. at 639-41. The State argued that the higher
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Louisiana,"5 3 both of which invalidated state taxes purporting to be
compensatory taxes, had implicitly overruled Darnell. The Supreme Court
of Indiana rejected this argument, stating "[b]ecause state taxes challenged
under the Commerce Clause [were] challenged on a case-by-case basis,"
it could not infer that Darnell was implicitly overruled without the U.S.
Supreme Court's specific direction that intangible taxes were no longer to
be construed as "valid compensating [taxes] for in-state property taxes on
domestic corporations."'154
The Taxpayers had attempted, but failed, to distinguish Darnell by
arguing that its conclusory analysis of "substantially equivalent events"
made it an equal protection case.'55 In addition, the Taxpayers argued that
the Indiana tax differed from the Darnell tax because the Darnell tax could
have been applied to Indiana intangibles if the property of the domestic
corporation was not exempt or not taxable to the corporation itself. In
contrast, under the Indiana scheme, domestic shareholders never had to pay
the intangibles tax.
The Indiana Supreme Court found this distinction between the two
taxes immaterial.5 6 Further, the Indiana Supreme Court clearly stated that
it viewed Darnell as a Commerce Clause decision.5 7 Yet, in relying upon
manufacturing tax was a compensating tax for the gross receipts tax, see id. at 642,
but the Court rejected this argument, holding:
Manufacturing and wholesaling are not "substantially equivalent events"
such that the heavy tax on in-state manufacturers can be said to compensate
for the admittedly lighter burden placed on wholesalers from out of State.
Manufacturing frequently entails selling in the State, but we cannot say
which portion of the manufacturing tax is attributable to manufacturing and
which portion to sales. The fact that the manufacturing tax is not reduced
when a West Virginia manufacturer sells its goods out of State, and that it
is reduced when part of the manufacturing takes place out of State, makes
clear that the manufacturing tax is just that, and not in part a proxy for the
gross receipts tax.
Id. at 643.
"' Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); see supra note 128.
154 Felix, 571 N.E.2d at 292.
"' The U.S. Supreme Court in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996),
however, latervalidated this conclusion. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
156 See Felix, 571 N.E.2d at 292-93.
117 See id. at 291-93. The court noted: "Eighty years ago, this Court and the
United States Supreme Court (in Darnell) sustained a virtually identical version of
the Indiana intangibles tax against a commerce clause challenge .... We find
Darnell controlling." Id. at 289. It appears that the Indiana Supreme Court viewed
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Darnell, which in turn relied upon Kidd (an equal protection case), the
Indiana Supreme Court arguably overturned Felix on tacit equal protection
grounds, neither engaging in a detailed compensatory tax analysis nor a
Commerce Clause analysis.'58
3. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner - The Demise of Darnell
The next significant development in the war between state intangibles
taxes and the Commerce Clause occurred in North Carolina, in Fulton
Corp. v. Faulkner.'59
At the time the case arose, North Carolina imposed an intangibles tax
on the value of shares of stock owned by state residents "inversely
proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax."'" In
determining their intangibles tax liability, however, residents were entitled
Darnell as a Commerce Clause/compensatory tax case (as opposed to an equal
protection case), since it noted the "substantial equality" language in Darnell and
commented that under the compensatory tax doctrine, "[t]he 'substantially
equivalent' events test is still used today to sustain taxes challenged under the
commerce clause." Id. at 291 (citing Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S. 916
(1990)). On the other hand, the Indiana Supreme Court stated that the pleadings in
Darnell revealed the Commerce Clause nature of the case. See id. at 292. The
Darnell Court relied solely on equal protection jurisprudence and did not mention
the Commerce Clause/compensatory tax doctrine as a rationale for its decision.
Thus, Darnell arguably could have been an equal protection case. See supra notes
139-42 and accompanying text. As previously noted, the Darnell opinion was so
concise that it has been difficult for later courts to discern whether the U.S.
Supreme Court's use of the "substantial equality" language truly involved
compensatory tax analysis.
158 See Felix, 571 N.E.2d at 287. When the Indiana Supreme Court overturned
the Superior Court's ruling in Felix that the tax was legal, the Taxpayers asked the
U.S. Supreme Court to hear their case. However, the case eventually settled. As
part of the settlement, that appeal was withdrawn, saving the state from a larger
refund. See id. at 289; Refunds Scheduled for Some Hoosiers, supra note 148, at
B14.
1'9 Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996). Fulton was actually filed
after St. Ledger; however, Fulton got to the U.S. Supreme Court first. The North
Carolina intangibles tax challenged in Fulton was repealed after the Supreme
Court's decision in Fulton without retroactive effect. See id. at 328 n. I (referring
to 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 41). The former intangibles tax was set out in sections
105 through 203 of the North Carolina General Statutes. See id.
160 Id. at 327.
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to take a "taxable percentage deduction equal to the fraction of the issuing
corporation's income subject to tax in North Carolina."''
Consequently, a corporation doing all of its business in North Carolina
would pay corporate income tax on 100% of its income, and the resident
shareholders of that corporation's stock would be entitled to a 100%
deduction under the North Carolina intangibles tax. In contrast, stock in a
corporation doing no business in North Carolina would be taxable on its
full value because there would be no percentage deduction. 62 Stockowners
of companies doing a portion of their business in North Carolina could
ascertain their taxable percentages from a publication of the North Carolina
Secretary of Revenue. "In 1990, for example, the Secretary determined the
appropriate taxable percentage of IBM stock to be 95%, meaning that IBM
did 5% of its business in North Carolina, with the stock held by North
Carolina residents being taxable on 95% of its value."163
Fulton Corporation ("Fulton") was a North Carolina corporation that
held stock in six corporations as of December 31, 1990.14 Only one of
those corporations conducted a portion of its business in North Carolina.
Consequently, Fulton paid a significant amount of intangibles taxes to
North Carolina for 1990.65 On May 1, 1991, Fulton filed suit against the
North Carolina Secretary of Revenue seeking a refund and a declaratory
judgment that the North Carolina intangibles tax violated the Commerce
Clause. The Wake County Superior Court granted summary judgment for
the Secretary of Revenue. 66
a. Court ofAppeals
Fulton then appealed to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina,
arguing that the intangibles tax violated the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution and the Due Process and Equal Protection
161 Id. (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-203). The percentage deduction
amount was computedby "applying a corporate income tax apportionment formula
averaging the portion of the issuing corporation's sales, payroll, and property
located in the state." Id. (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-130.4(i)).
162 See id.
163 Id. (citing N.C. Dep't of Revenue, Stock and Bond Values as of December
31, at39 (1990)).
'6 See Fulton Corp. v. Justus, 430 S.E.2d 494,496 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
16 See id. at 496-97. The actual amount of intangibles taxes paid by Fulton was
$10,884.00, which represented 54% of its stock in the company.
166 See id. at 497.
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Clauses of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions.'67 Fulton
contended that the intangibles tax violated the Commerce Clause because
the percentage deduction aspect of the tax encouraged investors to buy
stock in corporations doing business in North Carolina. Therefore, out-of-
state corporations could find it more difficult to raise capital in North
Carolina, and the trading of stocks in interstate commerce could decline. 68
The court of appeals, explicitly refusing to invoke the compensatory tax
doctrine, held that the "portion of the state's intangibles tax scheme which
increases the tax liability for owners of stock in corporations whose
business and property is not completely in North Carolina violates the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.' 1 69
The court commenced its analysis by asserting the principle that "[n]o
State may, consistent with the Commerce Clause, 'impose a tax which
discriminates against interstate commerce . . . by providing a direct
commercial advantage to local business."" 70 Based on this principle, the
court found the intangibles tax facially discriminatory because it encour-
aged "the development of local business by placing a greater burden on
economic activities occurring outside North Carolina than is placed on
similar activities within North Carolina."' 171
The court then analyzed whether the discriminatory impact of the
intangibles tax could be "counterbalanced" by a compensatory tax. The
Secretary of Revenue argued that the intangibles tax scheme "compensates
for the state's inability to tax the corporation's out-of-state property and the
income it generates." 72 Relying on Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty,73 the court
rejected this argument and held that the compensatory tax doctrine could.
not save the discriminatory aspects of the intangibles tax for two reasons.
First, the relationship between property taxes paid by a corporation and
intangibles taxes paid by a shareholder, like the relationship between
167 See id.
168 See id. Fulton also argued that "local corporations may be encouraged not
to enter interstate commerce in order to avoid the intangibles taxation for their
shareholders." Id.
169 Id. at 498-99.
'70 Id. at 498 (quoting Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'r, 429 U.S.
318, 329 (1977)).
17 Id. Therefore, in deciding which companies to invest in, taxpayers would
not act as if they were in a "no-tax" world.
'u Id. at 499; see also supra note 146.




manufacturing and wholesaling in Armco, Inc.,' 74 was too tenuous for the
intangibles tax to be classified as compensatory.'75 Second, the intangibles
tax (on shareholders) and the property tax (on corporations) were levied on
different taxpayers. Therefore, the taxes would not fall on substantially
equivalent events.17
6
Finally, the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the Secretary of
Revenue's argument that Darnell should be applied because it found the
tax in Darnell distinguishable from the North Carolina intangibles tax.'77
The court reasoned that in Darnell, there was a "one-to-one correlation
between property tax paid by the corporation and taxes paid by the
shareholder on shares owned."' 78 In contrast, in North Carolina, the
correlation was "between income taxed to the corporation and the taxes
paid by the shareholders.' 79 In North Carolina, income was determined by
three factors, and the property factor accounted for only one-fourth of the
apportionment formula.8 0 Furthermore, the policy against double taxation
emphasized in Darnell in applying Indiana law was not a fundamental
policy in North Carolina tax law.'8'
b. Supreme Court of North Carolina
The Secretary of Revenue appealedthe court of appeals' decision to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, arguing that the North Carolina
4 See supra note 152.
17 See Fulton Corp. v. Justus, 430 S.E.2d 494,499 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). The
court illustrated the vague relationship between intangibles taxes and property taxes
as follows: "under the tax scheme a corporation could pay no property taxes in
North Carolina, and the taxable percentage of its stock still be less than one
hundred percent because the taxable percentage is computed by multiplying three
factors: sales, payroll, and property." Id.
176 Further, the court of appeals explained that a tax on gross receipts is not a
proxy for a tax on manufacturing: "If a corporation owns no property in North
Carolina, the state has no burden of providing protection to the corporation's
property and should not be allowed to tax the corporation's stock as proxy for the
corporate property." Id.; see also supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text
(noting the difficulty in meeting the substantially-equivalent-events test).
177 See Fulton, 430 S.E.2d at 501.
17' Id.
179 Id.
10 See id. Sales and payroll are the other two factors that determined income,
with the sales factor being "double-weighted." Id.
181 See id.
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intangibles tax did not violate the Commerce Clause. 82 The supreme court
agreed with the Secretary of Revenue and reversed the holding that the
intangibles tax scheme was consistent with the Commerce Clause.'83 In its
analysis, the North Carolina Supreme Court relied heavily on Darnell to
sustain the intangibles tax as a compensatory tax. The court noted:
In Darnell the [United States] Supreme Court found substantial
equality, sufficient to satisfy the Commerce Clause, in taxing the stock of
foreign corporations not paying property taxes and taxing the property of
domestic corporations. In the instant case the state imposes an intangibles
tax on the shares of stock of corporations the amount of which is directly
and inversely proportional to the income of the issuing corporation which
is taxed in North Carolina. The effect is to reduce the intangibles tax
liability for stock held in a corporation to the extent the corporation's
income is taxed in this state and to increase the intangibles tax liability on
stock held in a corporation to the extent the corporation's income is not
taxed in North Carolina. This is the very kind of "compensating" tax
scheme the [United States] Supreme Court upheld in Darnell.84
182 See Fulton Corp. v. Justus, 450 S.E.2d 728, 729 (N.C. 1994). Fulton also
appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to strike only the unconstitutional
provisions of the intangibles tax. Id.
183 See id. at 735.
114 Id. at 732. Apparently, the Supreme Court ofNorth CarolinaviewedDarnell -
as a Commerce Clause/compensatory tax case. Fulton argued (as he did to the court
of appeals) that the tax in Darnell could be distinguished in two ways from the
North Carolina intangibles tax. First, unlikeFulton, " 'Darnelldealt with aproperty
tax on the shareholder that was directly offset by a property tax on the corpora-
tion.' "Id. (quoting plaintiffs' brief). Second, "while there might be a relationship
between the value of a corporation's stock and the value of its property, the
'relationship between the stock-issuing corporation's North Carolina income tax
and the shareholders' North Carolina intangible property tax' is 'vague."' Id. at
733 (quoting plaintiffs' brief). The Supreme Court of North Carolina dismissed
Fulton's first contention as an immaterial difference because - unlike the court of
appeals - it believed both property taxes and income taxes could offset the
intangibles tax in a similar manner. See id. at 732. The supreme court also rejected
Fulton's second argument because, as demonstrated by economists' reliance on
price-eamings ratios, there is a strong relationship (as opposed to a "vague"
relationship) between corporate income and the value of a corporation's stock.
"Corporate income tax, which is directly proportional to corporate income, affects




c. United States Supreme Court
After this decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court, Fulton
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The
Supreme Court granted the writ and laid Darnell to rest by holding that
North Carolina's intangibles tax discriminated against interstate commerce
in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause."' In its analysis, the Court
first set forth the general principle that state laws facially discriminating
against interstate commerce are" 'virtuallyper se invalid."'"86 It then held
that the North Carolina intangibles tax was clearly facially discriminatory
because it favored "domestic corporations over their foreign competitors
in raising capital among North Carolina residents."'87 It noted, however,
that the tax would be constitutional if it were a compensatory tax created
to equalize the burdens on interstate and intrastate commerce. 88 It then
scrutinizedthe intangibles tax under the three-prong Oregon Waste Systems
testto determine if the North Carolina tax could be saved by the compensa-
tory tax doctrine.8 9
First, to invoke the compensatory tax defense, a state must describe the
intrastate tax burden for which it seeks to compensate. The "intrastate tax
must serve some purpose for which the state may otherwise impose a
burden on interstate commerce."'90 The North Carolina Secretary of
Revenue asserted that the intangibles tax, with its percentage deduction,
compensated for the general income tax levied on corporations doing
business in North Carolina. The Court rejected this argument, however,
stating that "because North Carolina has no general sovereign interest in
taxing income earned out of state .... the Secretary must identify some in-
state activity or benefit in order to justify the compensatory levy."' 91 The
Supreme Court also recognized the "danger of treating general revenue
See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996). This ruling was con-
sistent with the judicial criticisms of Darnell, the attempts to distinguish Darnell,
andthe developing Commerce Clausejurisprudence. See supra notes 144-58, 172-
81 and accompanying text.
186 Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 331 (quoting Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Envtl. Quality Comm'n, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
187 Id. at 333. The Court also commented that the tax was facially discrimi-
natory because it discouraged domestic corporations from participating in interstate
commerce. See id.
18 See id. at 325 (citing Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994)).
19 See id. at 332-44; supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
190 Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 325.
'9' Id. at 334.
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measures," such as corporate income taxes, as "relevant intrastate burdens
for purposes of the compensatory tax doctrine."'92 This would allow states
to tax interstate commerce more heavily" 'anytime the entities involved in
interstate commerce happened to use facilities supported by general state
tax funds.',93 The Secretary then identified the maintenance of the North
Carolina capital markets (which were supported by the corporate income
tax) as the relevant in-state activity for justifying a compensatory tax. 94
Since foreign corporations escaped the corporate income tax, the Revenue
Secretary reasoned they should have to "pay" for access to the markets
through a tax on the value of shares sold. 195 The Supreme Court disagreed,
however, because it believed North Carolina provided for the maintenance
of its capital markets through its Blue Sky laws, as opposed to the general
corporate income tax.'96 Consequently, the tax failed the first prong of the
compensatory tax test.
Second, a State invoking the compensatory tax defense must prove that
"'the tax on interstate commerce... roughly... approximate[s] - but not
exceed[s] - the amount of the tax on intrastate commerce.' "197 The
Secretary of Revenue argued that the amounts of the intangibles tax and the
corporate income tax could be compared using price/earnings ratios.
However, the Supreme Court contended that the Secretary's suggestion
would involve a comparison of "apples to oranges," and the more proper
comparison would be between "the size of the intangibles tax and that of
the corporate income taxes component that purportedly funds the capital
market."'198 This comparison was practically impossible to make.199 The
192 Id. at 326.
"9 Id. at 335 (quoting Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality
Comm'n, 511 U.S. 93, 105 n.8 (1994)).
114 See id. at 336.
195 Id. at 326.
196 See id. Blue Sky laws regulate "who may sell securities in [a state], the
procedures that must be followed to do so, and the fees imposed for the privilege."
Id.
1 7 Id. at 336-37 (quoting Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 103).
191 Id. at 337. The basis for the court's "apples and oranges" reasoning was that
the general corporate income tax funds several activities, only one of which is the
maintenance of capital markets, the Secretary's only justification for the intangibles
tax. In making this comparison, the Supreme Court noted it was suppressing its
suspicion that North Carolina funded its capital markets through fees generated by
Blue Sky laws. See id. at 337-38.
See id. at 338. The impossibility results from the fact that corporate income
taxes are commingled with funds from other sources before they are earmarked for
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Secretary could not prove what portion of the corporate income taxes
supported the capital markets, nor whether this amount was greater than the
burden placed on interstate commerce by the intangibles tax. Thus, the tax
also failed the second prong of the compensatory tax test."0
Finally, a State invoking the compensatory tax defense must prove the
taxes fall on substantially equivalent events.20' The Secretary of Revenue
asserted that North Carolina had "assured substantial equivalence" because
of a direct correlation between "the percentage of share value subject to the
intangibles tax" and the "percentage of income earned within the state. 20 2
Furthermore, the Secretary argued that the intangibles tax and the corporate
income tax fell on economically equivalent values, and thus on economi-
cally equivalent events. The United States Supreme Court, however,
disagreed, finding that the intangibles tax was not "functionally equivalent"
to. the corporate income tax because "equality of treatment [did] not appear
when the allegedly compensating taxes [fell] respectively on taxpayers who
[were] differently described, as, for example, resident shareholders and
corporations doing business out of state."20 3 In addition, the Supreme Court
particular purposes. See id.
200 See id.
201 See id. As discussed in Part II.A, see supra notes 124-28 and accompany-
ing text, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the "substantial equivalent events"
requirement quite narrowly. Basically, the Court has only found the requisite
equivalence in the "sales/use tax context," rejecting equivalence arguments for the
"earning of income and the disposing of waste, . . . the severance of natural
resources from the soil and the use of resources imported from other states,... and
the manufacturing and wholesaling of tangible goods." Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at
338-39 (citations omitted). In these cases, the high Court held "that the paired
activities were not 'sufficiently similar in substance to serve as mutually exclusive
prox[ies] for each other.' "Id. at 339 (quoting Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 103).
The objective of the substantially-equivalent-events requirement is to allow in-state
and out-of-state companies "to compete on a footing of equality." Id. at 326.
202 Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 326 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-130.4(i)).
203 Id. The Court did note that a state could get around the "different taxpayer"
problem by showing that the actual incidences of the two tax burdens (as opposed
to the nominal incidences) are such that the real taxpayers are within the same
class. For example, the Secretary could have showed "the economic impact of
North Carolina's corporate income tax is passed through to shareholders of
corporations doing business in state in a way that offsets the disincentive imposed
by the intangibles tax to buying stock in corporations doing business out of state."
Id. at 341. However, the Secretary failed to meet this burden in Fulton, and the
Court stated that this burden would always be difficult to meet because of such
things as the "elasticities of supply and demand," the market structure, and the
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expressed doubt as to whether the corporate income tax was passed directly
through to shareholders." 4
Therefore, since North Carolina failed to satisfy any of the three
requirements needed to establish a valid compensatory tax, the United
States Supreme Court found the tax unconstitutional as facially discrimina-
tory. °" The Court concluded that Darnell could not save the intangibles tax
because Darnell's exclusive reliance on Kidd, an equal protection case,
indicated that Darnell should only be viewed as an equal protection case;
therefore, it was "no longer good law under the Commerce Clause."
2 6
Therefore, Fulton resulted in the complete demise of Darnell as a part of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, where before, Darnell had only been
criticized or distinguished.
4. The Post-Fulton Corp. Cases - Other than St. Ledger
This subpart will discuss how state courts, other than Kentucky courts,
responded to intangibles tax challenges following the decision in Fulton
Corp. Kentucky's response to Fulton Corp. will be discussed in Part In.
a. Pennsylvania
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth,"7 PPG ("Taxpayer"), a
Pennsylvania corporation, appealed a tax resettlement to the Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania, asserting that the manufacturing exemption
to Pennsylvania's capital stock tax violated the Commerce Clause of the.
United States Constitution."8 The Pennsylvania capital stock tax, applica-
ble to all corporations headquartered in Pennsylvania, provides an
ability of producers and consumers to substitute products. Id. Further, courts are
not very skilled at evaluating the "relative economic burden" of different taxes. Id.
at 342 (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 589-90 & nn.12-14 (1983)).
204 See id. at 343. For example, the actual burden of the tax could be borne by
consumers.
205 See id. at 344.
206 Id. at 345. Cf supra notes 157, 184 and accompanying text (explaining why
Darnell should be viewed as a Commerce Clause case).
207 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 832 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
208 See id. at 833. Taxpayer was in the business of manufacturing glass, fiber-
glass, and paint, and had its corporate headquarters in Pittsburgh. During 1983, the
tax year at issue, Taxpayer performed only a portion of its manufacturing in
Pennsylvania. See id. at 832.
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exemption stating that "in determining the relevant apportionment factors
the numerator of the property, payroll or sales factors shall not include any
property, payroll, or sales attributable to manufacturing, processing,
research or development activities in the Commonwealth."2 °9 Therefore,
only manufacturing in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania can be
exempted.
Taxpayer argued that the manufacturing exemption violated the
Commerce Clause because it discriminated against interstate commerce in
the same way as the percentage deduction in Fulton Corp.: it provided a tax
exemption for corporations headquartered in Pennsylvania that also
manufactured in the state. Thus, Pennsylvania corporations that manufac-
tured in other states were treated less favorably because they did not
receive the tax exemption.1
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania did not find Fulton Corp.
controlling because the manufacturing exemption, unlike the exemption in
Fulton Corp., did not distinguish between domestic and foreign corpora-
tions, and so did not discourage stock ownership of foreign corporations 211
The commonwealth court found that although the exemption encouraged
manufacturing in Pennsylvania, it did so without burdening any interstate
transaction because it did not involve any transactions across state lines.
Therefore, the manufacturing exemption was upheld.212
209 Id. at 833. The manufacturing exemption is located in section 7602(a) of
title 72 of the Pennsylvania Statutes. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7602(a) (West
Supp. 1997).
20 See PPG Indus., Inc., 681 A.2d at 834-35.
2. See id. at 835. The Pennsylvania court also noted that the manufacturing
exemption is not based on any transactions crossing state lines. Rather, the
exemption focuses on "how much of the corporate headquarters supports
manufacturing within the state." Id.
212 See id. The Pennsylvania court further noted in support of the manufac-
turing exemption that the purpose of the exemption is to encourage manufacturing
in the state, not to encourage companies to move their headquarters to
Pennsylvania. See id. at 835 n.7. The authors of this Note agree with the position
of the dissent:
The Department's application of the manufacturing exemption has a
discriminatory economic effect on multi-state corporations with a low
percentage of manufacturing in Pennsylvania. If a multi-state corporation
expands its manufacturing in another state, one of the direct costs of the
expansion is an increase in the capital stock tax. Conversely, if a multi-state
corporation expands in Pennsylvania the capital stock tax decreases. Not
only does the manufacturing exemption provide a positive incentive for
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There also have been several recent Commerce Clause challenges to
the Pennsylvania County personal property tax. In essence, the personal
property tax applies only to the stock of corporations that generate their
sole income outside of Pennsylvania and choose not to avail themselves of
the Pennsylvania market, because the tax exempts the stock of corporations
liable under the Pennsylvania capital stock tax.213
The first challenge was brought by Walter and Leonore Annenberg in
Annenberg v. Pennsylvania.214 The Annenbergs requested injunctive relief
multi-state corporations to increase manufacturing in Pennsylvania, but it
penalizes corporations for manufacturing in other states. Thus, the
Department's application of the exemption substantially discriminates
against out-of-state manufacturing in violation of the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 836. In Fulton Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court found the intangibles tax
facially discriminatory, in part because it discouraged domestic corporations from
participating in interstate commerce. See supra note 187. As the dissent in PPG"
Industries, Inc. stated, the Pennsylvania manufacturing exemption seems to do
exactly that because it penalizes corporations for manufacturing in other states.
213 See Christopher J. Hess, Note and Comment, The Constitutionality of Tax-
ing the "Stranger Within the Gates ": The Impact of Fulton v. Faulkner on the
Pennsylvania County Personal Property Tax, 16 J.L.& CoM. 233,240 (1997). The
Pennsylvania Personal Property Tax Act reads in pertinent part:
[A]ll personal property... is hereby made taxable annually for county
purposes, and, in cities coextensive with counties, for city and county
purposes, at a rate not to exceed four mills of each dollar of the value
thereof. . .[including] all shares of stock in any bank, corporation,
association, company, or limited partnership created or formed under the
laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, or of any other state or
government, except shares of stock in any bank, bank and trust company,
national banking association, savings institution, corporation, or limited
partnership, liable to a tax on its shares... or the capital stock tax or
franchise tax imposed... for State purposes.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 4821. The Capital Stock Tax applies to all corporations,
foreign and domestic, that are incorporated in Pennsylvania, transact business
within Pennsylvania, or receive a license to operate an enterprise within
Pennsylvania. See Hess, supra, at 239.
214 Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 686 A.2d 1380 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
Walter Annenberg, former U.S. Ambassador and former chairman of Triangle
Publications, Inc. (T. V. Guide, Seventeen, The Philadelphia Inquirer) is a multi-
billionaire and highly esteemed philanthropist devoted to educational concerns.
See, e.g., William Shawcross, Turning Dollars Into Change, TIME, Sept. 1, 1997,




and a declaratory judgment that the personal property tax violated the
Commerce Clause.21 Similarly, in Stranahan v. Mercer,2' 6 the taxpayers
brought a class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the
Pennsylvania personal property tax. The commonwealth court has not yet
decided the Commerce Clause issues in either of these cases. 27 Based on
the similarities between the Pennsylvania personal property tax and the
intangibles tax in Fulton Corp., it appears highly likely that the personal
property tax violates the Commerce Clause.2 8
b. Georgia
Until recently, Georgia also had an intangibles tax statute that pro-
bably violated the Commerce Clause under the Fulton Corp. test be-
cause it specifically exempted Georgia corporations.2 9 In Lombard v.
215 SeeAnnenberg, 686 A.2d at 1381. Specifically, with respect to corporations
not doing business or having a taxable situs within the Commonwealth, the
Annenbergs argued that the tax "impairs such corporations' ability to raise capital
in any county that imposes the tax because potential investors in such counties
know that any earnings from investment in such stocks will be reduced by the
amount of the tax, whereas similar investment in Pennsylvania corporations will
not." Id. at 1382.
216 Stranahan v. Mercer, 697 A.2d 1049 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
217 In Stranahan, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that a class
action could not be employed to obtain individual tax refunds because there was
a statutory remedy available. See id. In Annenberg, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania has only decided procedural issues, such as the facts that the
Commonwealth is not an indispensable party and the proper forum is the court of
common pleas. See Annenberg, 686 A.2d at 1385.
218 See Hess, supra note 213, at 236 (noting that the personal property tax is
clearly facially discriminatory because "it wholly exempts stocks of corporations
which engage in any significant Pennsylvania commerce, and conversely, it
subjects the shares of stock in out-of-state corporations which do not engage in
commerce in Pennsylvania to full taxability," id. at 240). The compensatory tax
doctrine would not save the tax because the capital stock tax and the property tax
do not fall on substantially equivalent events: the property tax taxes the value of the
stock in the hands of a shareholder, see id. at 242, while the capital stock tax taxes
the income and net worth of the corporation. Therefore, the tax does not fall on
identical parties as required by Fulton. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
219 See Lucy Soto, Counties Won Some, Lost Some - They Dodged Cuts in
SocialServices, But Intangibles Tax Repeal WillHurt, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar.
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Collins,220 Lombard Corporation sued the Commissioner of the Georgia
Department of Revenue, asserting the unconstitutionality of the Georgia
intangibles tax under the Commerce Clause." ' The tax levied was $1 for
every $1000 in stocks, bonds, and cash held by an investor in companies
based outside Georgia. Investments in Georgia-based companies were not
subject to the tax.2" On March 21, 1996, the Governor signed House Bill
No. 6 and House Bill No. 1101, which repealed the Georgia intangibles tax
on personal property? 3 The trial court dismissedLombardas moot because
a third party had satisfied Lombard's tax liability, thus leaving the
Commerce Clause issue unresolved. 4
C. The Probable Demise Under Fulton Corp. ofMost Intangibles
Tax-Exemption Statutes Favoring In-State Businesses Over
Out-of-State Businesses
As a result of Fulton Corp., it is now virtually impossible for states to
have intangibles tax statutes with exemptions favoring in-state businesses
over out-of-state businesses. The three-prong compensatory tax test
articulated by the Supreme Court in Fulton Corp. nullified the compensa-
tory tax defense except in the sales/use context and in the rare situation
where a state can meet the heavy burden of proving that the taxes fall on
substantially equivalent events.2 5 Consequently, many states have
22, 1996, atD4.
20 Lombard v. Collins, 480 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). The Lombard case
precipitated the repeal of the Georgia intangibles tax, which generated revenue of
roughly forty million dollars a year. See Soto, supra note 219.
221 The former Georgia intangibles tax was located in GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-6-
20 to 48-6-44. The sections were repealed effective March 21, 1996. See Ga. L.
1996, p. 117, § 6.
n2 See GA. CODEANN. §§ 48-6-20 to 48-6-23, repealed by Ga. L. 1996, p. 117,
§ 6.
' See Lombard, 480 S.E.2d at 47. House Bill No. 6 became law when the
governor signed it. House Bill No. 1101, on the other hand, became law only upon
voter approval. This legislation became effective beginning in the tax year 1996.
On November 5, 1996, the voters approved the repeal of the intangibles tax in
Georgia. See Arthur Brice, Clinton Wins, GOP Holds House, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Nov. 6, 1996, at Al.
224 See Lombard, 480 S.E.2d at 47. The Court of Appeals of Georgia agreed
that the suit appeared to be moot, but it certified a few questions to the Supreme
Court of Georgia regarding the mootness issue. See id. at 48-49.
225 See supra notes 185-206 and accompanying text.
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surrendered to the Commerce Clause by repealing their intangibles tax
statutes, thereby losing significant amounts of revenue.226
However, states still may have some ability to provide tax incentives
encouraging in-state economic development. For example, "to reduce the
capital costs for in-state businesses," California, Colorado, and Delaware
currently have statutes that provide "preferential tax treatment to investors
who provide funds to in-state businesses."2 7 Furthermore, many states have
adopted tax provisions such as investment tax credits, characteristic
location incentives, and job credits to attract businesses to their area." To
date, none of these provisions have been challenged under the Commere
Clause. 9 Since these tax incentives do appear to favor in-state over out-of-
state business activity, it may be only a matter of time before they are
challenged under the United States Supreme Court's anti-discrimination
standard." Thus, the modem Commerce Clause era has greatly curtailed
26 While it is certainly understandable that states would want to provide
incentives to encourage economic development within their borders, it must be
remembered that our country was built on the principle that states should not be
permitted to discriminate against interstate commerce. Otherwise, "the promotion
of in-state markets at the expense of out-of-state ones furthers the 'economic
Balkanization' that our Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has long sought
to prevent." Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848, 855 n.3 (1996) (quoting
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979)).
227 Enrich, supra note 112, at 386-87 & n.46 (citing CAL. REV. & TAX CODE
§ 18152.5 (West Supp. 1994) (exempting 50% of the gains from sales of stock in
qualifying in-state small businesses); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-22-518 (West
Supp. 1995) (waiving the state capital gains tax on the sale of an interest in a
Colorado business or property held for at least five years); and DEL. CODE. ANN.
tit. 30, § 1116 (Supp. 1994) (granting a 15% personal income tax credit for
investments in qualifying Delaware businesses)). Although these statutes appear
to be facially discriminatory in that they favor local businesses over out-of-state
businesses, they have not yet been challenged under the Commerce Clause.
228 See id. at 382-86.
229 See id. at 38 1. Enrich contends that these incentives have not yet been chal-
lenged because "the parties who are ordinarily in a position to bring challenges to
state business taxes, namely business taxpayers, have not found it in their interests
to attack this particular class of state tax policies." Id. at 408.
210 See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994). Enrich concedes
that these tax incentives are facially discriminatory. However, he asserts that the
Court should employ an antidistortion standard, instead of its traditional
discriminatory tax analysis, to evaluate state location incentives. This standard
would "judge whether a state tax incentive violates the Commerce Clause by
assessing whether that distorts economic decision concerning the location of the
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the ability of states to invoke the compensatory tax defense against dis-
criminatory tax legislation. It is against this background that the St. Ledger
decision emerged.
III. THEST. LEDGER CASE
A. Introduction
As discussed in Part I, before St. Ledger /, sixty years passed when
there were no legal challenges to the Kentucky intangibles tax.? While the
Fulton Corp.2 case in 1996 sounded a warning bell that Kentucky's
intangibles tax might violate the Commerce Clause, many had already
begun to challenge its validity by the late 1980s, both in the courtroom and
in the political arena. This challenge would ultimately prove successful in
1997 when the Kentucky Supreme Court handed down its final decision in
St. Ledger I.233
B. Post-Klein Developments
1. The Tax Begins to Be Enforced
All was quiet on the intangibles tax front both in the courts and in the
legislature for fifty years after Klein v. Jefferson County Board of Tax
Supervisors." Momentum for an intangibles tax 35 repeal began to build
in the late 1980s. The reason for the sudden outcry against a tax that had
been around in some form since the Civil War was simple. Until recently,
the tax had not been enforced. The state had no way of determining who
owed the tax since it did not have clear records of who owned stocks, and
business activity." Enrich, supra note 112, at 378.
23, See supra notes 25-79 and accompanying text.
22 Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848 (1996).
13 See St. Ledger II, 942 S.W.2d 893 (Ky.), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27
(1997).
" Klein v. Jefferson County Bd. of Tax Supervisors, 18 S.W.2d 1009 (Ky.
1929), affid, 282 U.S. 19 (1930).
" The modem form of the intangibles tax was structured as follows. Pursuant
to section 132.020(1) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, individual shareholders
were taxed on all corporate stocks. The stocks of corporations with 75% of their




relied instead upon self-reporting. Unsurprisingly, few Kentuckians
actually paid the tax.2
36
That all changed in 1987 when the state put the entire tax roll on
computers. The state then began to see an increase in intangibles tax
receipts. Additionally, Governor Wallace Wilkinson's administration
(1987-1991) began sending out notices with tax forms demanding payment
of the intangibles tax. 7 Later efforts included a doubling of the number of
Revenue Cabinet examiners who tracked the intangibles tax, as well as
checking dividends reported on federal tax forms to identify tax liability.238
By 1995, 112,000 taxpayers were paying the intangibles tax.?39
2. The Public Reacts
In response to increased collection of the intangibles tax and the
commencement of the St. Ledger litigation,24 business groups and
economists began speaking out against the tax. They argued that repeal of
the intangibles tax would stop many of Kentucky's wealthiest residents,
including the early "baby boomers" who were approaching retirement age,
from moving to Tennessee or Florida when they retired, because those
states do not have income taxes and rely mainly on sales taxes for revenue.
Since retirees tend to consume less, they would bear less of a burden of
taxation in Tennessee or Florida than would working families. "'Wealthy
people see it as a real impediment,"' according to Paul Coomes, a
University of Louisville economist.24 When these retirees leave, often they
take their wealth with them. This wealth could be invested in Kentucky
businesses or given to Kentucky foundations. Instead, the intangibles tax
effectively bankrolled out-of-state foundations and businesses because
Kentucky often did not see the fruit of its wealthy retirees' labor.
In 1992, the Kentucky Economic Development Corporation, a private
group composed of business leaders from around the state, urged the repeal
of the intangibles tax to improve Kentucky's ability to attract and retain
26 See Brammer, supra note 27, at A12.
237 See id.
28 See Associated Press, Intangible Tax Not Gone Yet, So Pay Before You Get
Caught, State Warns, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Dec. 28,
1994, at B3.
'9 See Court Questions State Corporate Stock Tax, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), May 21, 1996, at Cl.
240 See infra notes 242-57 and accompanying text.
241 Jim Jordan, Economist Offers Wish List for State, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Dec. 3, 1996, at B6 (quoting Paul Coomes).
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business. According to Ted Broida of Lexington, the group's vice
president, the tax impeded business development because it discouraged
those who made business-location decisions from wanting to relocate
here.242
Politicians began to make some noise as well. Members of the General
Assembly began filing bills that would amend the Kentucky Constitution
to abolish the intangibles tax.243 Starting in 1990 and continuing through the
1994 General Assembly, at least one bill was introduced during each
regular session. All of the bills were referred to committee, but none
received any consideration.2' The sponsor of one of the bills, Republican
Senator Art Schmidt from Cold Spring, echoed the comments of business
leaders: "'For anyone with significant wealth, it's silly to live in Ken-
tucky.' "245
242 See Brammer, supra note 27, at Al. In 1994, Columbia/HCA, the largest
for-profit hospital company in the country and a member of the Fortune 500,
moved a wholly owned subsidiary, Health Care Indemnity Inc., and its 40
Louisville employees across the Ohio River into Indiana to escape the intangibles
tax. The company paid $730,000 in tax on intangibles in 1994. See Kyung M.
Song, Columbia Moves Unit to Escape Intangibles Tax, THE COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 13, 1994, atD10. Columbia/HCA has since moved its entire
corporate headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee.
In another example, Vencor, Inc. a Louisville-based health care company that
just entered the Fortune 500 in 1997, was forced to restructure its corporate
holdings and set up a subsidiary so that its shareholders would be exempt from the
tax. See Ken Berzof, Dire Predictions are Made at Trial on Intangibles Tax, THE
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 27, 1992, at Cl.
23 Because of the mandate in section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution that all
property be taxed, see supra notes 45-48, an amendment, in addition to statutory
approval, would be required to abolish the intangibles tax.
244 In the 1990 General Assembly, Jon David Reinhardt and Pat Freibert filed
House Bill 805. In 1992, intangibles tax repeals were the subject of House Bill 81
filed by Ken Harper, House Bill 290 filed by Dorsey Ridley, House Bill 428 filed
by Jon David Reinhardt and Pat Freibert, and Senate Bill 40 filed by Arthur L.
Schmidt. During the 1994 General Assembly, Ken Harper and Bill Lear filed
House Bill 156 and Jim LeMaster filed House Bill 219. In the Senate, Senator
Richard L. Roeding was the primary sponsor of Senate Bill 103 and Senator Joseph
U. Meyer sponsored Senate Bill 105, which would have amended the Kentucky
Constitution to permit the General Assembly to repeal portions of the tax on certain
classes of intangibles.
245 Tangibly Unfair Tax on Intangible Property Should Be Scrapped,




A bipartisan Tax Policy Commission formed by Governor Brereton
Jones (1991-1995) recommended the repeal of the intangibles tax in 1995,
calling it a "red flag" for executives in companies looking at Kentucky.2'
Also in 1995, during the gubernatorial race, all but one of the candidates
for Governor told the Lexington Herald-Leader that they supported the
repeal of the intangibles tax. The lone holdout, then-Lieutenant Governor
Paul Patton, called for a comprehensive review of taxes that would include
the intangibles tax. 47
3. The 1996 General Assembly
This momentum prompted the 1996 Kentucky General Assembly to
finally consider the repeal ofthe intangibles tax on stocks. Debate revealed
a consensus in favor of amending the Kentucky Constitution to allow the
tax to be repealed. Constitutional amendments were proposed in both
houses to modify section 170 of the Constitution.4 The House passed such
an amendment, but neither bill could get through the Senate.249
Senate Republicans demanded that any amendment, if approved by the
voters, actually repeal the intangibles tax.20 Anything less, they argued,
246 KENTUCKY COMMISSION ON TAX POLICY, A BLUEPRINT FOR COMPREHEN-
SIVE REFORM 5-6, 29-30 (Nov. 15, 1995).
247 See Your Choice: Electing a Governor, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER
(Lexington, Ky.), Apr. 2, 1995, at E2.
248 See HB 718, Regular Session (Ky. 1996) (filed by Harry Moberly); SB 113,
Regular Session (Ky. 1996) (filed by John "Eck" Rose et al.) (stating that the
General Assembly could exempt all or any portion of the intangibles tax on any
class of personal property).
249 See Intangible Property Tax Bill to Die in Committee, LExINGTON HERALD-
LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Mar. 22, 1996, at B4.
2" See id. Part of the background in this debate was the fact that Republicans
had been vastly outnumbered by Democrats in both houses. Recent elections,
however, had increased the number of Republicans in the Senate to 17 out of a total
of 38. Through alliances with a number of conservative Democrats who could be
counted on to support many of their positions, the Republicans began to wield
substantial power. Whereas before Republicans could merely slow down
legislation, now they could actually stop legislation or force passage of a more
favorable bill. The 1996 General Assembly featured many such battles. The
intangibles tax battle was probably the most prominent of these. For an analysis of
the 1996 General Assembly, see Al Cross, The 1996 General Assembly; Partisan
Sparks Flew from Start to Finish, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Apr.
7, 1996, at D1.
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would be mere "subterfuge," leading the public to believe that the tax had
been repealed, when in fact, the General Assembly had only been given the
authority to repeal the tax."' With seventeen Republicans in the Senate
unwilling to support anything less than an outright repeal, no amendment
could pass both houses. 52
Perhaps Senator David Boswell summed it up best: "'We have failed
the people in this commonwealth."'253 The inability of the General
Assembly to pass a repeal of the intangibles tax left the issue in the hands
of the courts, as the St. Ledger case proceeded through the system.
C. St. Ledger Case
1. Background
After the Klein decision, no intangibles tax litigation occurred until
Herschel St. Ledger filed his class action lawsuit in 1990. St. Ledger was
a United States Army Corps of Engineers retiree who resided in Anchor-
age, a suburb of Louisville. He got his idea to legally challenge the
constitutionality of the Kentucky intangibles tax from "some Indiana
friends who were laughing at [him] because [he] had to pay the tax."2 54
Indiana had recently repealed its intangibles tax after it had been chal-
lenged in court. 5 Like most Kentuckians, St. Ledger didn't like the tax.
"'It's a nuisance tax, [that's] all it is. It improperly influences any person's
investment program, but especially elderly people whose income is fixed
and who depend on investments to help them along.' "256 St. Ledger's stock
holdings in Kentucky-based Louisville Gas & Electric and Humana were
exempt from the intangibles tax, but his stock holdings in National City
Bank of Cleveland were not.
"5 See Chad Carlton, Sharply Divided House Approves Amendment on Tax-
Cutting Power, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Mar. 14, 1996, at
C1.
" Constitutional amendments in Kentucky must pass both the House and the
Senate with a three-fifths majority to be placed on the ballot. See KY. CONST. § 256
(1892).
23 Intangible Property Tax Bill to Die in Committee, supra note 249, at B4
(quoting state Senator David Boswell).
254 Brammer, supra note 27, at Al.
" See Felix v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 502 N.E.2d 119 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986), rev'd, 571 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. 1991).
256 Brammer, supra note 27, at Al (quoting Herschel St. Ledger).
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St. Ledger, his wife Nicki, and some friends decided to join together
to file a class action suit. They founded a group called the Kentucky
Intangible Tax Committee, whose members would help to defray the costs
of litigation. More than 300 Kentucky residents joined the group." 7 St.
Ledger sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated and challenged the constitutionality of the
corporate shares tax258 as well as the bank deposits tax.259 He personally had
257 See id.
211 The courts used the term "corporate shares tax" to refer to the intangibles
tax on corporate stock that St. Ledger challenged in his lawsuit. The specific
statutes being challenged were the general tax on intangibles, section 132.020(1),
and the exemption for companies with at least 75% of their total property in
Kentucky, section 136.030(1).
The relevant parts of section 132.020(1) state:
An annual advalorem tax for state purposes of... twenty-five cents ($0.25)
upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of all money in hand, shares
of stock, notes, bonds, accounts, and other credits, whether secured ... or
unsecured, except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section...
shall be paid by the owner or person assessed except as provided in...
KRS 132.030 ... and other sections providing a different tax rate for
particular property.
K.R.S. § 132.020(1).
The relevant parts of section 136.030(1) state:
The individual stockholders of a corporation shall not be required to list
their shares for ad valorem taxation so long as the corporation pays taxes to
the State of Kentucky on at least seventy-five percent (75%) of its total
property, wherever located.... In order to obtain this exemption, the
stockholder shall furnish satisfactory proof to the Revenue Cabinet that at
least seventy-five percent (75%) of the total property of the corporation as
hereinabove specified is taxed in the State of Kentucky.
Id. § 136.030(1).
29 Unlike corporate stock, deposits in Kentucky banks are not exempt from
taxation; rather, they are taxed at lower rates pursuant to section 132.030. Out-of-
state banks were taxed at the higher rate provided in section 132.020(1). See supra
note 251. The court referred to this taxing scheme as the Bank Deposits Tax.
The relevant parts of section 132.030 state:
(1) Every person having a deposit in any financial institution, as defined in
section 136.500, Kentucky Revised Statutes, on January 1 of any year shall
pay an annual tax to the state equal to one-thousandth of one percent
(0.001%) upon the amount of the deposit, and no deduction shall be made
for any indebtedness ....
(2) No other tax shall be assessed by the state or any county, city, or other
taxing district on the deposits or against the depositor on account of the
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deposits in some Kentucky-based savings and loan institutions that were
taxed at a lower rate than deposits he had in one out-of-state institution.
260
St. Ledgerbasedhis claims on the Commerce Clause26' ofthe United States
Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of both the United States
Constitution262 and the Kentucky Constitution,26 and the Classification,
Uniformity and Equality of Taxes Provision of the Kentucky
Constitution." Klein stood in the way of all but the Commerce Clause
claim, however, and little in the development of Kentucky common law on
the subject of the intangibles tax exemption had occurred since Klein.265
A different precedent stood in the way of challenges to the bank
deposit tax266 based on Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal
protection grounds. In Madden v. Kentucky,26 the Supreme Court held that
the taxpayer could not offer enough evidence to overcome the presumption
that the classification in the bank deposit tax was not "hostile and
oppressive discrimination. 12 8 The purpose behind the tax - to compensate
for the difficulties and expenses of tax collection in the out-of-state banks269
-was warranted because it was not "hostile and oppressive discrimination
against particular persons and classes." 270
Similarly, Darnell and the compensatory tax doctrine27' stood in the
way of the Commerce Clause claim. However, much case law had
developed that brought into question the continued validity of Darnell.21
deposits.
K.R.S. § 132.020.
260 See St Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, No. 90-CI-06075, slip op. at
3 (Jefferson Cir. Ky. July 1, 1992).
261 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
262 Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
263 KY. CONST. § 3.
264 Id. § 171; see text at supra note 46.
265 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
267 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) (holding that a higher tax rate on
out-of-state bank deposits does not violate the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution).
268 Id. at 88.
269 See id. at 89-90.
270 Id. at 88.
271 See supra notes 116-28 and accompanying text (discussing the compen-
satory tax doctrine in detail).




In fact, in light of those developments, this claim appeared particularly
strong. Both taxes clearly discriminated against interstate commerce by
applying a lower or zero tax rate on in-state bank deposits and corporate
stock, respectively. St. Ledger was prepared to offer the testimony of
business leaders and residents about the discriminatory effects of the taxes
and how the taxes affected investment decisions.273 Only the compensatory
tax doctrine could save the tax from Commerce Clause challenges. With
the status of that doctrine in doubt,27 4 St. Ledger was confident. He argued
that the proper remedy was to strike down both the exemption statutes and
the taxes themselves, since the General Assembly contemplated the two
statutes as a whole. One would not have been passed without the other.27
To eliminate the exemption would remove the Commerce Clause problem,
but it would frustrate the legislative intent because all bank deposits and
corporate stockwouldbe subject to the higher rates, a scenario not intended
by the General Assembly.276
The Revenue Cabinet obviously relied on the validity of Klein and
Darnell.277 The goal of the higher bank deposits tax on out-of-state bank
deposits was to offset the higher collection cost for out-of-state banks,
while the goal ofthe corporate stocktax exemptionwas to eliminate double
taxation. The Cabinet believed that both goals were legitimate and did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause, just like the tax challenged in Klein.27
The Cabinet argued thatDarnell's compensatory tax doctrine controlledthe
Commerce Clause claim. Alternatively, if Darnell were held to be no
longer valid, the Cabinet argued that only the exemptions should be
invalidated. All stocks and bank deposits should be subject to the higher
273 See supra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 116-28 and accompanying text (discussing the compen-
satory tax doctrine in detail).
275 See Appellant's Brief at 7, St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 942
S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1997) (94-SC-468-DG, 94-DC-875-DG, July 18, 1996).
276 See id.
277 Initially, the Revenue Cabinet relied on Klein only. After the Indiana
Supreme Court decision in Indiana Dep "t of State Revenue v. Felix, 571 N.E.2d
287 (Ind. 1991), see supra notes 147-58, the Cabinet began to cite Darnell. The
Revenue Cabinet also questioned the standing of St. Ledger to bring suit, pointing
in particular to the fact that deposits were made and shares were purchased
specifically for purposes of the lawsuit. See Appellee's Brief at 3-8, St. Ledger v.
Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 942 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1997) (94-SC-468-DG, 94-DC-
875-DG, Aug. 19, 1996).
278 See Appellee's Brief, supra note 277, at 23-24.
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tax.17 9 This would be in keeping with section 170 of the Kentucky
Constitution requiring that all property be taxed and would in no way
frustrate the intent of the General Assembly, since the tax is designed
primarily to raise revenue and not to avoid double taxation.280 The Revenue
Cabinet was also prepared to argue that bank deposits were not interstate
commerce. 28' The financial impact of the tax loomed large in the Revenue
Cabinet's opposition to the St. Ledger claims.
2. Financial Impact of Tax
Throughout the trial, it was difficult to determine precisely the
potential financial impact of the St. Ledger case on Kentucky. The most
cited figure was that $25 million was generated annually by the Corporate
Shares Tax.282 The Revenue Cabinet obviously had a strong financial
interest in keeping this revenue flowing into the state's general fund. Of far
greater concern, however, was the amount ofrefunds, if any, that the courts
might grant to those Kentuckians who had already paid the tax.283
This amount was dependent upon a number of factors. The obvious
first factor was the number of years for which the state would allow
taxpayers to claim refunds.28 4 If the filing of the St. Ledger suit constituted
an application for refund for all taxpayers, as St. Ledger argued, then
refunds would have to be paid back to 198 8.285 An internal Finance Cabinet
memorandum estimated that this would generate $320 million in refund
claims.286 The state's rainy day fund contained about $200 million dollars
279 See id. at 26-31.
280 See id. at 53.
"' The Revenue Cabinet relied upon section 287.030(3) of the Kentucky Re-
vised Statutes, which states that non-Kentucky banks may not transact any banking
business in Kentucky except to lend money. Thus, banks and bank deposits are
local in nature. See id. at 9.
282 See Memorandum, Consensus Forecasting Group, Kentucky Office of Fi-
nancial Management and Economic Analysis, Fiscal Impacts of Selected
Legislation (Mar. 12, 1996).
13 The return of previously paid taxes plus interest would have a much larger
impact on the state's general fund. Estimates ranged from $208 to $320 million.
See id. at3.
284 See K.R.S. § 134.590 (Michie Supp. 1996). The period for which refunds
wouldbe available was disputed in litigation, however. See infra notes 351-484 and
accompanying text..
" See infra notes 351-484 and accompanying text.
286 See Memorandum, Consensus Forecasting Group, supra note 282, at 3.
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at the time.2 7 A second factor affecting the potential amount ofreftmds was
whether or not the state had to pay interest on the refunds. The internal
Finance Cabinet memorandum assumed interest would have to be paid. A
final factor would be the refund procedure. If taxpayers were automatically
given refunds, more money would have to be paid out than if taxpayers had
to be proactive and file claims. 88 Regardless of the exact dollar amount, the
financial stakes were significant for the state.289
3. St. Ledger I
a. Circuit Court - "A Ruling Neither Side Really Asked for"90
After a bench trial that featured testimony from many prominent
business leaders on behalf of St. Ledger as well as an amicus curie brief
filed by the Kentucky Chamber of Commerce,29" ' on July 1, 1992 the
Jefferson Circuit Court found that the exemption statute was so "obviously
unenforceable as written"292 and so "incomplete or conflicting in pro-
287 See Tom Loftus, Deal Settles Intangible-Tax Case; First Refunds May Go
Out in 2 Weeks, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 11, 1997, at Al
[hereinafter Loftus, Deal Settles Intangible-Tax Case]. The rainy day fund is a
discretionary fund for fiscal emergencies.
288 See infra notes 351-484 and accompanying text.
289 The final settlement included the approximate figures of $143 million in
refunds plus $40 million in interest. See Agreed Judgment of Satisfaction and
Resolution at 6, St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, No. 90-CI-06075
(Jefferson Circuit Court, Sept. 10, 1997).
290 Ken Berzof, Judge Rejects Tax Exemption for Investors in State's Firms,
THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 3, 1992, at Al (describing St.
Ledger attorney's characterization of the Jefferson Circuit Court's ruling).
291 The Chamber of Commerce joined St. Ledger on behalf of its 3000 member
businesses based or operating in Kentucky. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Kentucky
Chamber of Commerce at vi., St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 942
S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1997) (94-SC-468-DG, 94-SC-875-DG, Sept. 18, 1996). The
Chamber of Commerce was concerned that the Revenue Cabinet's position that the
corporate share tax should extend to all corporate stock would "severely and
adversely impact (if not destroy) Kentucky's business and investment community."
Id. at 14. Its arguments were similar to those of the taxpayers in support of the
position that the entire statute was unconstitutional. On the issue of refunds, the
Chamber supported the limitation of refunds to two years. See id.
292 St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, No. 90-CI-06075, slip op. at 11-
12 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. July 1, 1992).
1110 [VOL. 86
ST. LEDGER V KENTUCKYREVENUE CABINET
visions" 93 that it was void. To assist taxpayers in preparing their returns,
the Revenue Cabinet had provided taxpayers with a list of in-state, and thus
exempt, corporations. Because such a list was not provided for by statute,
the circuit court found the state had exceeded its statutory authority. Yet,
without such a list, it would be impossible for the taxpayer to pay the
corporate shares tax;2 94 thus, the corporate shares tax exemption was found
to be unenforceable as written. The circuit court's decision did not reach
the Commerce Clause claims, although it noted the corporate shares tax
"significantly impact[ed] interstate commerce."295 This ruling meant that
all stock would be taxed at the higher rate, since only the exemption was
ruled unconstitutional, not the entire taxing scheme.
The Jefferson Circuit Court further found that the bank deposits tax
violated the Commerce Clause and was unconstitutional.296 It found no
evidence to support the Revenue Cabinet's claim that a higher rate on out-
of-state bank deposits was needed to offset the higher cost of collection of
the tax.297 Thus, out-of-state bank deposits were to be taxed in the same
manner as in-state bank deposits.298 Attorneys for St. Ledger described this
ruling as" 'winning the battle but losing the war,' "since everyone now had
to pay a higher rate of taxes on stock.299
b. Court ofAppeals - "Bank Accounts, by There [sic] Very
Nature, Do Not Fall into the Category ofInterstate Commerce "300
A three-judge court of appeals panel in May 1994 reversed the circuit
court's ruling on the corporate shares tax, finding the statute enforceable
as written.3°' The court of appeals noted that if the Revenue Cabinet could
compile a list of exempt corporations by obtaining information directly
from those corporations, their shareholders could as well. Thus, the court
of appeals reasoned, the statute did not place an unenforceable burden on
the taxpayers since they could get their own information or use the
293 Id.
294 See id. at 6-7.
295 Id. at 5.
296 See id. at 12.
297 See id. at 9.
298 See id. at 10-11.
299 Berzof, supra note 290, at Al (quoting one of St. Ledger's attorneys).
" St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, No. 92-CA-2688-MR, slip op. at
21 (Ky. Ct. App. May 20, 1994).
301 See id. at 16, 21.
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Revenue Cabinet's information.3 2 Moreover, the court of appeals foundthe
service offered by the Revenue Cabinet did not exceed its statutory
authority; rather, the Cabinet's listing of exempt corporations merely
assisted taxpayers in determining their liability.0 3
This line of reasoning made sense. Taxpayers must rely upon informa-
tion from their employers to determine wages paid and taxes withheld.3 4
They also may rely on the Internal Revenue Service's listing of organiza-
tions that qualify as non-profit30 to determine if they may take a charitable
deduction. 6 Courts have not found reliance on such lists of information to
represent the kind of burden on the taxpayer that would render the
respective statutes unenforceable.
The court of appeals then proceeded to resolve two claims with respect
to the corporate shares tax not addressed by the circuit court. The first
claim was that section 136.030(1) violated both the Kentucky and federal
Constitutions' Equal Protection Clauses and section 171 of the Kentucky
Constitution concerning uniformity, equality, and classification of taxes,
because it discriminated between in-state and out-of-state corporations.30 7
This claim failed because the justices found Klein311 controlling on this
issue. Klein upheld the validity of the statute as a reasonable attempt to
alleviate double taxation.3°
Finally, the court of appeals addressed the Commerce Clause claim.
The court held that the intangibles tax did in fact discriminate against
interstate commerce by exempting from taxation the shares of in-state
corporations.310 The court, however, held that the compensatory tax
32 See id. at 7.
303 See id.
3M See 26 C.F.R. § 31.6051-1(a) (1997) (governing employerwage statements
for employees).
305 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
316 See 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(n)(3)(iii)(a). In Publication No. 78, the Internal
Revenue Service ("I.R.S.") set forth a "Cumulative List of Organizations described
in section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954," a list of non-profit
organizations the I.R.S. continues to use in issuing ruling or determination letters
relied upon by taxpayers.
307 See St. Ledgerv. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, No. 92-CA-2688-MR, slip op.
at 8 (Ky. Ct. App. May 20, 1994).
308 See Klein v. Jefferson County Bd. of Tax Supervisors, 18 S.W.2d 1009 (Ky.
1929); see also supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
319 See Klein, 18 S.W.2d at 1012.
310 See St. Ledger, No. 92-CA-2688-MR, slip op. at 11-12.
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doctrine31' saved such a tax from unconstitutionality.312 Citing Darnell,313
the court of appeals held that a tax on out-of-state corporate stock was
constitutional because elimination of double taxation was a justifiable and
legitimate burden on interstate commerce,314 and observed that it "[knew]
of no other practical way of equalizing the impact upon interstate com-
merce, and, at the same time, preventing what essentially amount[ed] to
double taxation.1315
One "other practical way," of course, did exist: The General Assembly
could repeal the entire statute. Furthermore, the court of appeals' reliance
on Darnell was extremely questionable in light of the extensive develop-
ment of the compensatory tax doctrine in the years since 1912, as the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Fulton Corp. demonstrated.
Even though Darnell had not been explicitly overruled, more recent
Supreme Court cases, such as Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax
Commission,316 Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty,31' and Maryland v. Louisiana,3 18
which rejected the compensatory tax doctrine for the challenged taxes,
indicated that Darnell's holding and analysis were, at best, questionable.3 19
On the issue of the bank deposits tax, the court of appeals also reversed
the circuit court, holding that bank deposits, by their very nature, were not
interstate commerce, and focused narrowly on the statutory requirement in
section 287.030(3) that out-of-state banks could conduct no banking
business other than lending money.320 Thus, the court concluded that
Kentucky banks were "local in nature and not national.1321
311 See id. at 13-16; see also supra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
312 See St. Ledger, No. 92-CA-2688-MR, slip op. at 13.
313 Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U.S. 390 (1912); seesupra notes 129-42 and accom-
panying text. The U.S. Supreme Court in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325
(1996), however, asserted that Darnell should be seen mainly as an equal
protection case. See id. at 345-46.
314 See St. Ledger, No. 92-CA-2688-MR, slip op. at 16.
315 Id.
316 Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
117 Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984).
318 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
3 See supra notes 128, 143-54 and accompanying text.
320 Section 287.030(3) reads:
No bank incorporated under the laws of another state or national bank
having its principal place of business outside this state shall transact any
banking business in this state except to lend money ....
K.R.S. § 287.030(3) (Michie 1996).
321 St. Ledger, No. 92-CA-2688-MR, slip op. at 19.
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That might have been true early in this century, but by the 1990s it was
clearly not the case. Many of Kentucky's biggest banks had been purchased
by out-of-state bank holding companies and so were not "local in
nature." '322 In fact, many community activists in Kentucky have complained
that such purchases by out-of-town banks cause local deposits to leave the
local market and be invested in the bank's other markets. 3 Furthermore,
ATM networks like Cirrus enable bank customers to withdraw money from
their bank accounts, not only in another state but also in another country.
Finally, the federal government recognizes the interstate nature of bank
deposits by insuring all deposits in banks and savings and loans up to
$100,000.24
In holding that bank deposits were not interstate commerce, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals ignored a long line of Commerce Clause cases
that broadly defined interstate commerce.32 For example, the United States
Supreme Court as far back as 1903 held that lottery tickets were interstate
commerce, even though they could be sold only in the state authorizing
them.326 Lottery tickets are analogous to bank deposits. Anyone, even a
" See, e.g., Toya Richards Hill, Liberty National Bank, Bank One to Merge,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Aug. 5, 1994, at C7; Jim Jordan,
Fifth Third, Provident Making Plans to Join Highly Competitive Lexington Banking
Market, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), July 8, 1991, at D1.
323 See Housing Groups Oppose Area Bank Merger, THE COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 20, 1997, at D1.
324 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1995).
31 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) ("Al-
though activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they
have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control
is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,
Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.") (citing Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)); Carter v. Carter Coal, 298
U.S. 238, 298 (1936) ("As used in the Constitution, the word 'commerce' is the
equivalent of the phrase 'intercourse for the purposes of trade,' and includes
transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities between the citizens
of the different states. And the power to regulate commerce embraces the
instruments by which commerce is carried on.... [T]he phrase 'Commerce among
the several states' was defined as comprehending 'traffic, intercourse, trade,
navigation, communication, the transit of persons, and the transmission of
messages by telegraph, - indeed, every species on commercial intercourse among
the several states.' "Id. at 298 (citations omitted)); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S.
321, 326 (1903) ("[T]he carrying from state to state of lottery tickets constitutes
interstate commerce.").
326 See Champion, 188 U.S. at 326.
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non-resident, can buy lottery tickets as long as she is in a state that permits
their sale. If she is the lucky winner, she can take her winnings back to her
state of residence. Similarly, anyone can make a deposit in any bank and
be paid interest on her deposit. If she desires, she may withdraw her funds
and use them in any state that she chooses. Therefore, the court of appeals'
statement that banking in Kentucky is purely "local in nature" was plainly
wrong. This effort to so narrowly construe section 287.03 0(3) demonstrated
the lengths to which the Revenue Cabinet and the courts were willing to go
to defend such a blatantly unconstitutional statute.
c. Kentucky Supreme Court-
"'If We Were Going to Lose One of Them,
This Is the One to Lose' "327
On October 19, 1995, the Kentucky Supreme Court in St. Ledger I
affirmedthe decision of the court of appeals upholding the corporate shares
tax but reversed its decision as to the bank deposits tax. Like the court of
appeals, in upholding the corporate shares tax, the Kentucky Supreme
Court foundbothKlein andDarnellto be controlling.328 The supreme court,
however, not surprisingly, recognized the flaw in the court of appeals'
analysis of the bank deposits tax, holding that bank deposits are an
instrument of interstate commerce. Pointing to a United States Supreme
Court case that held that investment funds, like bank deposits, are interstate
commerce,329 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that because the tax
created an advantage for Kentucky banks at the expense of out-of-state
banks, it clearly violated the Commerce Clause.330 The court made no
attempt to save the tax by applying the compensatory tax doctrine of
Darnell. On the issue of refunds, the Kentucky Supreme Court agreed with
327 Jack Brammer & Chad Carlton, Tax on Money Outside Kentucky Loses in
Court But Ruling Lets Intangible Tax on Corporate Stocks Continue, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Oct. 20, 1995, at Al (quoting Alex Rose, a
Revenue Cabinet official).
2 See St. Ledger I, 912 S.W.2d 34, 39-40 (Ky. 1995) (noting that the com-
pensatory tax doctrine saved the corporate stock tax from Commerce Clause
challenges and that the classification was a reasonable way of alleviating the
burden of double taxation), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996), on
remand, 942 S.W.2d 893 (Ky.), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).
329 See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331
(1977).
330 See St. Ledger I, 912 S.W.2d at 40, 43.
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the circuit court that refunds of taxes paid for the period beginning two
years before the date the lawsuit was filed and ending with its conclusion
(pursuant to section 134.590) should be paid. The court also awarded St.
Ledger attorney fees for the costs and fees pertaining to the challenge to the
bank deposits tax.33
While recognizing the obvious - that bank deposits are interstate
commerce - the Kentucky Supreme Court still relied on the outdated
application of the compensatory tax doctrine of Darnell in upholding the
constitutionality of the tax on corporate stock.332 Neither party was
completely pleased with the results. St. Ledger wanted to appeal the
corporate shares tax decision, while the Revenue Cabinet wanted to appeal
the bank deposits tax decision.
4. St. Ledger II - "It's Finally Happened"'333
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court in Fulton Corp. held the
North Carolina intangibles tax unconstitutional. 34 In doing so, it overruled
Darnell, holding that the compensatory tax doctrine could not save the tax
from invalidation under the Commerce Clause. This decision had clear
ramifications for Kentucky's corporate shares tax, since the Kentucky
Supreme Court had relied on the validity of Darnell for its holding in St.
Ledger 1,3 which had upheld Kentucky's intangibles tax and exemption.
The Kentucky intangibles tax scheme was similar in effect to the one ruled
unconstitutional in Fulton Corp.336 Thus, in St. Ledger II, the remaining
issues were whether to sever the exemption from the corporate shares tax
or strike down the whole tax scheme; for what length of time, if any,
taxpayers were entitled to refunds; and whether the court should award
attorney fees and costs. 337
331 See id. at 43.
332 See id.
331 Loftus, Kentucky Tax on Stocks Struck Down, supra note 98, at Al.
31 See supra notes 159-206 and accompanying text.
331 St. Ledger 1, 912 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct.
1821 (1996).
336 The North Carolina taxing scheme called for the tax rate to be proportional
to the amount of taxes paid to the state by the corporation. Compare K.R.S. §§
136.030(1), 132.020 (Michie Supp. 1996) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-203 (1996).
See also supra note 159.
331 See generally St. Ledger II, 942 S.W.2d 896 (Ky.), cert. dismissed, 118 S.
Ct. 27 (1997). The bank deposits tax ruling was left standing upon the Kentucky
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In addressing the first issue, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided to
strike down the entire corporate shares tax.33 8 The court determined that the
entire tax was designed to eliminate double taxation and that striking only
the exemption would result in taxation of both a corporation and its
shareholders, a "direct contravention of the expressed intent of the General
Assembly. '39 Invalidating only the exemption would in effect result in the
creation of a new tax by the judiciary, a violation of the separation-of-
powers doctrine since only the legislative branch had the power to create
a tax.314
The court also ruled that the filing of St. Ledger I in 1990 did not
constitute notice to. taxpayers and that taxpayers were only entitled to
refunds dating from two years before filing an application pursuant to
section 134.590(2)."4' Further, it denied St. Ledger's request for payment
of any attorneys' fees and costs, calling the Revenue Cabinet's reliance
upon Darnell justifiable. 2
Taxpayers across the Commonwealth were ecstatic about the court's
main conclusion striking down the corporate shares tax. St. Ledger,
however, still wanted to appeal the court's rulings concerning refunds and
attorneys' fees, while the Revenue Cabinet wanted to appeal the invalida-
tion of the corporate shares tax and the decision that interest was owed on
the tax refunds.34 3 Finally, on September 10, 1997 the parties reached a
settlement agreement.3" Refunds would be available for a two-year period,
as held in St. Ledger II. Interest would be payable on these refunds. 345
Supreme Court's denial of rehearing.
338 See id. at 898.
33 Id. at 897. Of course, in Klein v. Jefferson County Board of Tax Supervisors,
18 S.W.2d 1009, 1010-12 (Ky. 1929), the court had stated that taxing a corporation
and its shareholders was not double taxation.
340 See KY. CONST. § 28 (Separation-of-Powers Clause).
34 See Part IV for further discussion.
312 See St. Ledger II, 942 S.W.2d at 903. Calling it unjustifiable, of course,
would have called into question the court's earlier decision in St. Ledger I.
141 See Loftus, Deal Settles Intangible-Tax Case, supra note 287, at Al. St.
Ledger filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. See St.
Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, filed July 21, 1997 (97-127). The petition
was dismissed upon settlement on Sept. 22, 1997. See St. Ledger v. Kentucky
Revenue Cabinet, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).
"' See Agreed Judgment of Satisfaction and Resolution, St. Ledger v. Ken-
tucky Revenue Cabinet (No. 90-CI-06075) (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Sept. 10, 1997).
141 See id. at 4.
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Attorneys' fees equal to six percent of the tax to be refunded346 were to be
paid to St. Ledger's attorneys. Both sides agreed to drop further appeals. 47
Thus, the tax that would not die finally did. Unfortunately, Herschel St.
Ledger died in 1996 before the conclusion of the litigation bearing his
name.3 48 Hal Miller, one of the members of the Kentucky Intangible Tax
Committee commented, "'It's too bad Herschel isn't around to celebrate
with us.'" But Miller added: "'I'm glad it's over. We've been vindicated,
and I think we did a real service for the taxpayers." 49 Despite the
celebration, Miller and other members of the group are still bitter. "'They
dragged this case out for years and were rewarded for doing so in the end
because the courts limited the amount of refunds they have to pay.' ,3s0
IV. TAXPAYERS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A BROAD WINDOW
OF OPPORTUNITY IN WHICH TO FILE APPLICATIONS FOR REFUNDS
St. Ledger's victory was diminished for Kentucky taxpayers who had
paid the intangibles tax but had not filed an application for refund within
two years from the date their payments were made. While in an earlier
case5 the Kentucky Supreme Court had held that Kentucky's statute
providing for refunds of taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute352
applied retroactively, in St. Ledger the court limited refunds to taxpayers
who filed applications within two years from the date their tax payments
had been made.353 In so doing, the court created two classes of property
346 Attorneys' fees totaled approximately $8.5 million. See id. at 5.
141 See id. at 6.
348 See Loftus, Deal Settles Iniangible-Tax Case, supra note 287, at Al.
141 Id. (quoting Hal Miller).
350 Id. (quoting Hal Miller).
3 SeeKentucky Revenue Cabinetv. Gossum, 887 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1994)
(noting that federal law was irrelevant regarding whether refunds for taxes paid
pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be retroactively paid because, as a
matter of state law, section 134.590 mandates refunds). Although Gossum was
decided during the course of the St. Ledger litigation, the Kentucky Supreme Court
noted that by enacting section 134.590, the Commonwealth had consented to
retroactively refund taxes paid under unconstitutional statutes. See id. Cf, e.g.,
Department of Revenue v. Jack Cole Co., 474 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Ky. 1971) (stating
that section 134.590 "simply requires the Department of Revenue to refund taxes
paid under a statute 'held unconstitutional' ").
352 See K.R.S. § 134.590(2).
313 See St. Ledger H, 942 S.W.2d 893, 900 (Ky.), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27
(1997) (holding that the limitations period for taxpayer refunds was two years from
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owners: 54 the well-advised who were informed of the need to file refund
claims early in the course of the St. Ledger litigation,355 and those who
either relied upon the litigation as their application for refund or who did
not know they needed to file for a refund." 6 Refunds for the well-advised
could extend as far back as 1988, while in contrast, refunds for the less-
experienced would likely be limited to only two years of tax payments,
3 7
since the less-experienced might have been unaware of the constitu-
tional challenge or the need to act.3 8 In both classes, the financially savvy
and the financially unsophisticated, the tax disproportionately affected
senior citizens living on fixed incomes from retirement investments,
359
an effect that would not necessarily be remediated for those finan-
cially savvy enough to have been filing returns since St. Ledger first filed
suit.3 A legislative fix was needed, but a legislative fix was not to be
found. 6'
the date of tax payment, as laid out in section 134.590(l)-(2)).
31 See id. at 903 (Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
355 Refunds for the financially savvy intangible property owners could extend
as far back as 1988, provided a taxpayer filed an application for refund with the
Department of Revenue in 1990. See K.R.S. § 134.590(2); see also St. Ledger I,
942 S.W.2d at 903 (Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that the "wealthy, better informed, and publicly served class will receive refunds
back to 1988").
356 See K.R.S. § 134.590(2).
357 See id.
"', See St. Ledgerff, 942 S.W.2d at 903 (Graves, J. concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
119 See Brammer, supra note 27, at Al. State Representative Dorsey Ridley said
about the tax, "'I'm hearing from a lot of people, especially senior citizens, who
have set up nest eggs for their retirements and are seeing them being raided.' "Id.
(quoting Dorsey Ridley). Herschel St. Ledger agreed, noting that the tax worked
a much greater hardship on "'elderly people whose income is fixed and depend on
investments to help them along.' "Id. (quoting Herschel St. Ledger). The majority
of the citizens comprising the Kentucky Intangible Tax Committee, formed by St.
Ledger to fight the tax, were senior citizens. See id.
360 As between seniors citizens who filed refund claims early in the litigation
and those who did not file, however, the effect would be somewhat lessened.
Seniors citizens, as well as other taxpayers who paid the intangibles tax outside the
permitted refund period, would never be able to recover the full amount of
unconstitutional taxes collected.
361 See supra notes 243-53 and accompanying text.
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A. Taxpayers Argue that Meaningful Relief Must Be Broader than
that Accorded by Section 134.590(2)
1. Due Process Did Not Require an Extension
of Time to File an Application for Refund
The most important problem for St. Ledger was proving how far back
refunds wouldbe allowed. St. Ledger arguedthat under section 134.590(6),
"where the amount of taxes due is in litigation ' 362 taxpayers should have
two years from the date the amount is determined (that is, in St. Ledger,
when the lawsuit was resolved) to file their applications for refund. 63 The
Revenue Cabinet, on the other hand, successfully argued that even if St.
Ledger were entitled to a refund, under section 134.590(2) he could only
receive one if he had applied for it within two years of having paid the
intangibles tax.3 4 Unfortunately, one of the great ironies of section
134.590(2) is that a taxpayer may receive very little redress from a taxing
statute being declared unconstitutional. Because section 134.590(2),365
which pertains to refunds when state statutes are held unconstitutional,
prohibits refunds unless the taxpayer applies within two years of paying the
tax, many taxpayers would stand to lose significant amounts of money if
they were ignorant of the St. Ledger lawsuit and had not taken action to
preserve their rights. The statute does not toll for lack of notice,36 nor can
amended returns revive the time period for filing once it has expired.367
Even assuming a taxpayer applied for a refund on grounds of unconstitu-
tionality before the St. Ledger suit was filed, her application still might
have been rejected by the Revenue Cabinet two years after the date her tax
payment was made.36 But the greater difficulty for most taxpayers to
overcome was that they simply did not know the intangibles tax was being
challenged, so they had no reason to know that it was important for them
to file a refund application. Doubtless, many of those who knew of the
362 K.R.S. § 134.590(6) (Michie Supp. 1996).
363 St. Ledger I, 942 S.W.2d at 898-99.
364 See Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 23-24.
361 "No refund shall be made unless an application for refund is made within
two (2) years from the time payment was paid." K.R.S. § 134.590(2).
366 See infra note 468.
367 See infra notes 387-88 and accompanying text.
368 See K.R.S. § 134.590(2). Cf. Griggs v. Dolan, 759 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Ky.
1988) (discussing section 134.590(6)). It is unclear what the effect of a rejected
application would be.
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class action considered it to be their" 'clear and certain remedy." 369 But
even if they knew about the lawsuit, it did not necessarily alert them to the
need to file for a refund.
St. Ledger, therefore, argued that section 134.590(6) preserved the
taxpayers' right to go back and file refund applications at least to the date
the lawsuit was filed, once the unconstitutionality of the statute had been
determined.37 To support this argument, St. Ledger asserted that the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Griggs v. Dolan37" ' and Barrett v. Reynolds372
did not distinguish among taxing entities in applying section 134.590(6)
(which governs refunds by all taxing entities other than the Revenue
Cabinet3n3) and that both cases "adhered to the principle that a taxpayer
must have sufficient time after the holding of unconstitutionality within
which to make the 'paper' application for refunds of taxes paid within two
369 See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 495
U.S. 18,32 (1990) (quoting Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280,
285 (1912)).
370 See St. Ledger , 942 S.W.2d 893, 899 (Ky.), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27
(1997); Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 21.
371 Griggs v. Dolan, 759 S.W.2d 593 (Ky. 1988). In this class action, taxpayers
sought review on matters relating to an unconstitutional method of 1981 farm tax
assessment by the Fayette County property valuation administrator. The court noted
three stages to the litigation. In Dolan v. Land, 667 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1984),
"Chapter I," the method used was declared unconstitutional. See Griggs, 759
S.W.2d at 594. "Chapter II" was Board ofEduc. v. Taulbee, 706 S.W.2d 827 (Ky.
1986), in which the court decided that the taxpayers needed to apply for refunds
individually, and that they could not recover refunds from the Board of Education
for 1981 because it had not been a party to the litigation. See Griggs, 759 S.W.2d
at 594. "Chapter In" was Griggs v. Dolan, wherein the Kentucky Supreme Court
construed section 134.590(6) to mean that the outer time limit in which the
taxpayers could apply for refunds was two years from the date their litigation
ended. See id. at 596.
31 Barrett v. Reynolds, 817 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1991). This case involved a
challenge to the method used by the Owsley County property valuation
administrator to reassess farm and commercial property. Barrett held, as did
Griggs, see supra note 371, that under section 134.590(6), the outer time limit for
applying for a tax refund stemming from a suit challenging a local taxing entity's
assessment is two years from the final judgment. See Barrett, 817 S.W.2d at 441-
42.
33 See Taulbee, 706 S.W.2d at 829. Section 134.590(6) applies to city, urban-
county, county, school district, or special district ad valorem taxes. See K.R.S. §
134.590(3). Arguably, however, the local applicability of section 134.590(6) is
unclear from the text. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 18-32.
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years prior to the filing of the action."374 Thus, limiting taxpayers to filing
for refunds within two years of their tax payments-rather than within two
years from conclusion of the litigation-would be tantamount to switching
tax refund procedures midstream, and would violate due process.37
Moreover, St. Ledger argued that federal due process mandates under
McKesson Corporation v. Division ofAlcoholic Beverages and Tobacco376
required the same time extension (two years from the conclusion of
litigation) to be applied under section 134.590(2). 7
Conversely, the Revenue Cabinet argued first that taxpayers were not
entitled to any retroactive relief, and alternatively, if they were, only to the
two years permittedby section 134.590(2). 378 In review of these arguments,
the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected out-of-hand the notion that section
134.590 provided anything less than retroactive relief, noting that "KRS
134.590 requires some type of [retroactive] refund as a matter of state law,
3' Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 23-24.
375 See id. at 31-32. St. Ledger believed such "bait and switch" remedies, id. at
32, violated due process requirements laid out in Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106
(1994), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that Georgia could not provide a
post-deprivation tax refund statute, then declare its remedy did not exist after
taxpayers had paid disputed taxes, successfully challenged them, and applied for
a refund. See id. at 111.
376 McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 495 U.S.
18 (1990).
177 See St. Ledger II, 942 S.W.2d 893,901 (Ky.), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27
(1997); Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 23-24.
371 See Appellee's Brief, supra note 277, at 44-50. Later, the Revenue Cabinet
conceded that section 134.590 applied retroactively. See St. Ledgerll, 942 S.W.2d
at 898-99. In arguing for no retroactive relief, the Revenue Cabinet pressed for
application of the test set out in Chevron Oil Co. v. Hudson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-08
(1971), which was that a decision should not be retroactively applied if on the
whole it establishes a new principle of law, if retroactive application would retard
the operation of the new law, and if retroactive application would cause injustice
or hardship. Chevron Oil Co. has been heavily criticized and impliedly overruled.
See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752-54 (1995) (noting that
reliance on a prior federal law that is overruled - "a reliance of the same kind and
degree as that involved in Chevron Oil" - does not warrant refusing to retroactively
apply the new rule of law); Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97
(1993) (stating "'an opinion announcing arule of federal law normally is properly
understood to have followed the normal rule of retroactive application"' (quoting
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 539 (1991)).
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independent of [federal] due process requirements. 379 Moreover, the court
noted that the Revenue Cabinet had finally conceded this point.380
Key to the court's thinking on both the retroactivity and due process
issues was its decision in Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. GossuM,38' issued
during the pendency of St. Ledger. In Gossum, federal retirees brought a
class action lawsuit seeking a refund of taxes assessed under an unconstitu-
tional Kentucky statute3 82 that had taxed a portion of federal retirement
annuities but exempted all state retirement annuities. 383 Gossum unequivo-
cally stated that "inasmuch as the Commonwealth [had] consented by
statute to refund taxes paid under an unconstitutional provision," the
Revenue Cabinet's position in St. Ledger against retroactivity384 was
moot.
385
But the assurance of retroactive application did not guarantee St.
Ledger full refunds of unconstitutionally collected taxes. Section
134.590(2) stated that no refunds would be made under a tax statute held
unconstitutional unless an application for refund was made within two
years from the date the tax payment had been made.386 The Kentucky
Supreme Court was not persuaded by St. Ledger's arguments that
meaningful backward-looking relief 387 could be found only if the suit had
tolled section 134.590(2)'s time limit for filing refund applications or the
379 St. Ledger I, 942 S.W.2d at 899 (discussing McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at
31).
380 See id. at 898-99.
381 Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gossum, 887 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1994).
382 The statute, section 141.02 1, was repealed by the Kentucky legislature after
the United States Supreme Court found that a similar statute, section 206.301(1)(f)
of the Michigan Compiled Laws, violated intergovernmental tax immunity under
the U.S. Constitution. See Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803,
810-17 (1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.301(1)(f) (West Supp. 1988).
383 See Gossum, 887 S.W.2d at 331.
384 The Kentucky Supreme Court noted that, regardless of the Chevron Oil
factors, see supra note 378, David v. Michigan and Harper v. Virginia Dep 't of
Taxation unambiguously required retroactive application. See Gossum, 887 S.W.2d
at 332 (discussing the leading case, Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S.
86 (1993) ("The legal imperative 'to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after
the case announcing the rule has already done so' must 'prevail over any claim
based on a Chevron Oil analysis."' Id. at 98 (paraphrasing James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540 (1991))).
385 Gossum, 887 S.W.2d at 331 (citing K.R.S. § 134.590(2)).
386 See K.R.S. § 134.590(2).
387 See Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 12-31.
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time limit of section 134.590(6) was applied two years from the end of
litigation.388 St. Ledger's argument that a much larger "window of
opportunity" for the taxpayers to request relief was mandated in order to
meet fundamental federal due process requirements did not avail.389
Moreover, the court refused to apply the extended limitations period of
section 134.590(6), holding that as far back as Taulbee,390 it had "dis-
tinguishe[d] that the Revenue Cabinet [should] refund under K.R.S. §
134.590(2) and that K.R.S. § (3), (4), (5), and (6) [apply] to the refund of
all othertaxing districts. '39' The court further statedthat section 134.590(6)
couldnot properly be interpreted by analogy to section 134.59 0(2) since the
former applies to litigation about the amount of taxes owed, rather than
litigation over the constitutionality of a exemption: "[T]he amount of taxes
due is not an item of litigation. It is an issue of all the tax or none of the
tax."
392
St. Ledger's failed "window of opportunity" argument was based on
McKesson Corporation v. Division ofAlcoholic Beverages and Tobacco.
In McKesson Corp., the United States Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution required retroactive relief
as a post-deprivation remedy to taxpayers who paid taxes under a Florida
388 See St. Ledger II, 942 S.W.2d 893, 898-902 (Ky.), cert. dismissed, 118 S.
Ct. 27 (1997); Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 22-26.
389 McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S.
18 (1990). In McKesson Corp., Florida liquor distributors challenged a state excise
tax that provided tax reductions for beverages made from Florida citrus, grapes,
and cane sugar, then bottled in Florida. See id. at 22-24. Like Kentuckians
challenging the intangibles tax, see St. Ledger II, 942 S.W.2d at 893, the Florida
liquor distributors could not refuse to pay their excise taxes without being subject
to fines, nor could they refuse to pay taxes while challenging its constitutionality,
see McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 31. Unlike Kentucky, however, once the tax had
been declared unconstitutional, Florida refused to refund any taxes paid or provide
any post-deprivation remedy. See id. at 26. The United States Supreme Court held
that federal due process protections required Florida to provide some form of
retroactive relief, specifically holding that Florida was required to refund taxes
because it was too late for "prompt injunctive relief' to have had any effect. Id. at
41-43.
... Board of Educ. v. Taulbee, 706 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1986).
39' See St. Ledger I, 942 S.W.2d at 901.
392 Id. In so ruling, the Kentucky Supreme Court foreclosed any equal pro-
tection arguments that the two statutes treated two similar classes of taxpayers
differently. Cf Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 755-57 (1995)
(stating in dicta that the cure for differential tax treatment among similar taxpayers
would be either to similarly burden or similarly unburden both groups).
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statute later determined to be invalid. 393 But the Supreme Court also noted
that providing retroactive relief could "undermine the State's ability to
engage in sound fiscal planning"3 94 and to address this problem permitted
states to impose procedural requirements, including short statutes of
limitations, on post-deprivation remedies.395 The taxpayers in McKesson
Corp. actually received broad relief because Florida had refused to provide
any pre-deprivation or post-deprivation remedies for unlawful tax
assessments.396
Thus, to meet St. Ledger's due process challenge, the Revenue Cabinet
needed only to argue section 134.590(2) in rebuttal. St. Ledger would
receive relief through a tax refund, but he would not receive relief to the
extent he had hoped for. As McKesson Corp. noted, due process does not
require complete relief. A state may impose any number of procedural
protections designed to "secure the State's interest in stable fiscal planning
when weighed against its constitutional obligation to provide relief for an
unlawful tax."3 97 Thus, while the Commonwealth's tax "scheme [was]
pointedly designed to coerce taxpayers into remitting taxes before
challenging any liability,"3 98 its post-deprivation remedies, though limited,
met the fundamental due process concerns of McKesson Corp.3 99 The
Kentucky Supreme Court did not address the notion that a "bait and
switch" of remedies had occurred.4"
While this statutory construction is the legally correct one, it does not
provide much justice for the many Kentucky taxpayers who relied on the
St. Ledger lawsuit to vindicate their claims to refunds of taxes wrongfully
collected. Without a doubt, section 134.590(2) requires refund applications
to be filed within two years from date of payment. Also without a doubt,
taxpayers relied on the St. Ledger suit - and justifiably so - to preserve their
9 See McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 44-45.
194 Id. at 44.
395 See id.
396 See id. at 51 (noting that Florida was free to choose any form of relief that
comported with federal requirements, "ranging from a refund of the excess taxes
paid ... to an offsetting charge to previously favored distributors, that [would] cure
any unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce during the
contested tax period").
391 Id. at 45.
398 Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gossum, 887 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Ky. 1994).
As previously discussed, in Kentucky such refunds are required "as a matter
of state law, independent of due process requirements." St. Ledger , 942 S.W.2d
893, 899 (Ky. 1997).
400 See id. at 899-90 1.
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claims. This is particularly troubling given that the Revenue Cabinet is
under no obligation to inform taxpayers when taxing statutes are chal-
lenged.40 I The only early public notice the Revenue Cabinet gave was not
really public notice at all: in its March 1993 Kentucky Tax Alert (a
publication largely directed at CPAs and other tax professionals), the
Revenue Cabinet advised that protective refunds should be filed regarding
"the exemption from intangible tax of stock owned by in-state corpora-
tions," '2 hardly an accurate description of the St. Ledger litigation. So the
end result of St. Ledger was that the general public did not receive public
notice that the Commonwealth was taxing them unconstitutionally, and a
member of the general public did not receive a refund of wrongfully paid
tax money unless he or she filed an application for a refund of taxes he or
she did not know were improperly collected. In simple terms, Kentucky
taxpayers found themselves to be in the proverbial catch-22.4 °3
2. The Filing of the Lawsuit Should Have
Constituted an "Application "for Relief
St. Ledger then argued that, if section 134.590(6) did not allow
taxpayers to file their applications for refund up to two years after the
conclusion of the litigation, then in order to afford them "meaningful,
backward-looking relief,' '411 both due process4 5 and issue preclusion4°6
401 See supra note 439.
402 Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 8 (quoting Kentucky Revenue Cabinet,
Kentucky Tax Alert, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Mar. 1993)) (emphasis added).
403 "There was only one catch... and that was Catch-22." JOSEPH HELLER,
CATCH-22 (frontispiece) (Simon and Schuster 1961); see also id. at 397-99,411-
19.
41 See Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 24.
405 See id. at 12-13.
40 See id. at 13-14. The taxpayers argued that the broader relief permitted in
St. Ledgerlregarding refunds of the bank deposits tax should be applied to refunds
of the corporate shares tax, since the same statute, section 134.590, imposed both
taxes. See id. at 14. In St. Ledger I, the Kentucky Supreme Court agreed with the
Jefferson Circuit Court's holding that the taxpayers could apply for tax refunds
under section 134.590. See St. Ledger I, 912 S.W.2d 34, 43 (Ky. 1995), vacated
and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996). Problematic was the circuit court's ruling
that the taxpayers were eligible for refunds on taxes paid from July 24, 1988
forward. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 14 (citing circuit court's order).
Thus, the taxpayers in St. Ledger lI reasoned that, based on the Kentucky Supreme
Court's seeming affirmation of the circuit court's order in St. Ledger I, they
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required that the filing of the St. Ledger lawsuit either constituted the
required statutory application for refund407 under section 134.590, "or at
least preserve[d] the right... to file an application" for the entire class of
taxpayers.40 8 Thus, St. Ledger asserted that the Commonwealth was
obligated to refund tax payments as far back as 1988, two years before the
lawsuit was first filed.4 9 Moreover, St. Ledger believed that the Revenue
Cabinet had been put on notice by the filing of the lawsuit, and that, in the
absence of a statutory procedure for the filing of a refund application, the
lawsuit should have sufficed.410
In arguing for a preserved right to file an application, St. Ledger relied
heavily upon Department ofRevenue v. Jack Cole Co.,411 and on the dissent
in Board of Education v. Taulbee," which was partially adopted by the
likewise should be able to apply for intangibles tax refunds back to July 24, 1988
under the law-of-the-case doctrine (or issue preclusion). See St. Ledger II, 942
S.W.2d 893,899 (Ky.), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997). The law-of-the-case
doctrine, however, requires courts to be bound by their earlier conclusions of law
when deciding subsequent appeals. See Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847,849 (Ky.
1982) (holding that when an issue of law has been decided in a previous appeal,
that decision precludes the issue's reconsideration on a second appeal; otherwise,
"litigation would be interminable, and a decision of the appellate court, which is
supposed to put the issue to rest between the same parties, would only be a starting
point for new litigation"). In St. Ledger II, however, the Kentucky Supreme Court
was not revisiting a previously decided issue of law (the bank deposits tax); it was
re-examining a different constitutional challenge, that of the challenge to the
corporate shares tax. Thus, the law-of-the-case doctrine was irrelevant. See St.
Ledger II, 942 S.W.2d at 899.
407 See Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 19-22. Section 134.590(2) states
that the Department of Revenue shall not refund taxes paid under a tax statute that
has been held unconstitutional unless "an application for refund is made within 2
(two) years from the time payment was made."
408 Id. at 21 (citing Department of Revenue v. Jack Cole Co., 474 S.W.2d 70
(Ky. 1971)). Appellants argued that "the filing of a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of a taxing statute either constitutes the filing of an application or
preserves the right of a taxpayer to file an application for refund of taxes paid
within two years prior to the filing date of that litigation." Id.
41 St. Ledger filed suit in 1990. See Chris Nolan, State PoisedforPossible Tax
Hike: Revenue Cabinet Argues Stock Tax Should Apply to Kentucky Companies,
THE KENTUCKY GAZETTE (Lexington, Ky.), July 9-15, 1996.
410 See Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 21.
41, Department ofRevenue v. Jack Cole Co., 474 S.W.2d 70, 73-74 (Ky. 1971).
412 Board of Educ. v. Taulbee, 706 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1986).
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Kentucky Supreme Court in Griggs v. Dolan.a1 In Department ofRevenue
v. Jack Cole Co., the Jack Cole Company ("Company") applied for refunds
for fuel taxes paid on fuels bought in Kentucky but used in the Company's
motor vehicles operating outside the state. The Company filed suit and, by
mutual agreement with Ashland Oil & Refining Company, let its suit
"languish" until the resolution of the Ashland Oil litigation that resulted in
the tax being declared unconstitutional." 4 At that time, the Company
sought to recover its tax refund under section 134.590(1)-(2), which
governs refunds of taxes paid into the State Treasury pursuant to statutes
subsequently held unconstitutional.4" 5
Because section 134.590(l)-(2) did not provide a procedure for filing
an application for refund of taxes under an unconstitutional statute, the
Revenue Cabinet was required to calculate refunds from the date the
Company first formally requested a refund on the grounds of unconstitu-
tionality: the date the lawsuit was filed.4" 6 Although under the taxing
statute, the Company had other applications for refunds filed on forms
provided by the Revenue Cabinet, the forms did not constitute an applica-
tion for refund because "they were not calculated to initiate a decision by
the [Revenue Cabinet] on the issue of the right to refund on the basis of
unconstitutionality of the statute." 7 The filing of the Company's appeal
413 Griggs v. Dolan, 759 S.W.2d 593 (1988). Neither Griggs nor the Taulbee
dissent suggested that the taxpayers were entitled to refunds without filing
individual applications with the appropriate administrative agency. See id. at 597;
Taulbee, 706 S.W.2d at 832 (Leibson, J., dissenting). Griggs did, however, note
that section 134.590(6) provided enough time for taxpayers to seek refunds after
the unconstitutionality of an assessment was established. See Griggs, 759 S.W.2d
at 596.
414 See Jack Cole Co., 474 S.W.2d at 71-72; Kentucky Dep't of Revenue v.
Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 449 S.W.2d 904 (Ky. 1970).
411 Section 134.590(1)-(2) states as follows:
(1) When it appears to the appropriate agency of state government that
money has been paid into the State Treasury for ad valorem taxes when no
taxes were in fact due or for taxes of any kind paid under a statute held
unconstitutional, the agency of state government which administers the tax
shall refund the money, or cause it to be refunded, to the person who paid
the tax ....
(2) No refund shall be made unless an application for refund is made within
two (2) years from the time payment was made ....
K.R.S. § 134.590(1)-(2) (Michie Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
416 See Jack Cole Co., 474 U.S. at 74.
417 Id. Cf., e.g., 103 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1.010 (1997) (providing that taxpayers
must file written protests of assessments to pursue an administrative proceeding to
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on the ground of unconstitutionality was the application for refund.1 8
Consequently, the Kentucky Supreme Court ordered a refund of taxes paid
two years before the date of filing, or for about seven years. 41 9 Thus, under
the Jack Cole Co. standard, St. Ledger would have been entitled to refunds
from 1988 to the present.
Although Jack Cole Co. was brought under section 134.590(l)-(2), it
was not a class action suit. Where class actions like St. Ledger have been
filed, the judgment of the Kentucky Supreme Court, albeit, regarding the
sister statute section 134.590(6), which applies only to local advalorem tax
refunds,420 has been that a protective claim must be filed by each class
member individually.42' Thus, the Revenue Cabinet disputed that filing any
lawsuit could ever constitute an "application" for purposes of section
134 .5 90 (2),4' arguing instead that the statute required applications for tax
refunds to be made individually.41 CitingBoardofEducation v. Taulbee,424
and analogizing to sections 134.590(6) to 134.590(2),425 the Revenue
Cabinet contended that St. Ledger's lawsuit was not a refund application
nor did it retroactively preserve the Taxpayers' applications for refunds
until the lawsuit concluded.426
Taulbee dealt with a successful class action suit challenging the
constitutionality ofschool tax assessments under section 134.590(6), rather
than the state ad valorem refund statute, section 134.590(2). In it, the
Kentucky Supreme Court held that "original litigation over the constitu-
tionality of the assessment in itself" would not authorize an automatic
refund because the statute was not self-executing.427 Taulbee required
determine the correctness of the assessment).
418 See Jack Cole Co., 474 S.W.2d at 71, 73-74.
419 See id.
420 See Board of Educ. v. Taulbee, 706 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1986).
42 "[The Kentucky Supreme Court] has specifically held that a class action
relief is not available for the refund of taxes." See id. at 828 (citing Swiss Oil Corp.
v. Shanks, 270 S.W. 478 (Ky. 1925), in which, under an earlier statute similar to
section 134.590, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the Swiss Oil Corporation
could not sue on behalf of all other oil producers for a refund of taxes under the
graduated occupational tax statute that Swiss Oil was challenging as invalid).
41 See Appellee's Brief, supra note 277, at 50-51.
41 See id. (citing Taulbee, 706 S.W.2d at 829).
424 Board of Educ. v. Taulbee, 706 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1986).
41 Section 134.590(2) does not extend the time for filing an application.
426 See Appellee's Brief,'supra note 277, at 50-51.
427 Taulbee, 706 S.W.2d at 829. The Kentucky Supreme Court noted:
Obviously, the only way a statute can be held unconstitutional is when
11291997-98]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
applications for refunds to be made individually.428 The Taulbee plaintiffs,
therefore, were not entitled to automatic refunds by virtue of their
lawsuit.429
Regrettably, neitherJack Cole Co. nor Taulbee shed much light on how
to apply for a refund to the Revenue Cabinet when the constitutionality of
a taxing statute is being challenged. Neither subsection (2) nor (6) of
section 134.590 provides guidance. The Revenue Cabinet's rules in the
Kentucky Administrative Code are likewise silent on this issue.43 Notice
to the Department seems to be an important element; that is why an
individual lawsuit should suffice.43 Yet something more individual than
being a party to a class action lawsuit is required.432 Oral protests are not
enough.4 3 Filing an amended tax return outside the two-year limitation
period with a refund request does not suffice,434 nor does it overcome
section § 134.590(2)'s two-year statute of limitations.4 35 Third-party refund
a court makes such a decision. The filing of a lawsuit does not automatically
entitle a plaintiff to a refund without further action ....
The original litigation over the constitutionality of the assessment in
itself does not automatically authorize a refund. K.R.S. 134.590(6) is not




430 The Department of Revenue has issued no rules governing such applica-
tions, although an administrative regulation governs protest of tax assessments
under the taxing statute. See 103 KY. ADMiN. REG. 1:0 10.
411 See Department of Revenue v. Jack Cole Co., 474 S.W.2d 70, 73-74 (Ky.
1971).
432 See Taulbee, 706 S.W.2d at 829; St. Ledger , 942 S.W.2d 893,901 (Ky.),
cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).
" See McNeely v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 1996 WL 391209, * 1 (Ky. Bd.
Tax App., July 10, 1996).
14 See id. Mr. McNeely had paid state income tax on part of his federal retire-
ment annuity income. AfterKentucky Revenue Cabinetv. Gossum, 887 S.W.2d 329
(Ky. 1994), see infra notes 386-90 and accompanying text, his first written request
for refund was made on May 5, 1989; therefore, he could not receive refunds
further back than May 4, 1987. To overcome the time limits of section 134.590(2),
Mr. McNeely filed amended income tax returns for the years 1981 to 1985 and
included a rafund request with each return. The Revenue Cabinet declined to count
his amended returns as proper applications for refund. See McNeely, 1996 WL
391209, at *1.
411 See McNeely, 1996 WL 391209, at*1.
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requests pass muster with the Revenue Cabinet.436 Yet St. Ledger II, while
noting that the issue of what constitutes a sufficient tax refund application
was raised,4 7 did nothing to resolve the problem, focusing instead on which
statute of limitations applied to refunds.
Perhaps it is not a matter that can be resolved by the Kentucky
Supreme Court; rather, it should be resolved through rulemaking by the
Revenue Cabinet. The irony is that, because taxpayers in St. Ledger did not
know how (or when) to file an application, "their legal rights were cut off'
when they were required to apply to the Revenue Cabinet while the
unconstitutionality of the taxing statute was being litigated. 3 Moreover,
taxpayers in general may or may not have notice of such lawsuits,
depending on their sophistication and access to financial planners and
accountants. The Revenue Cabinet is under no obligation to notify the
public of pending lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of taxing
statutes.439 Yet the Cabinet is uniquely equipped by virtue of its computer
436 According to the Kentucky Society of Certified Public Accountants, "If the
requester is a bank trust department, broker, agent, executor/administrator,
attomey-in-fact, or an authorized legal representative of the taxpayer," third-party
refund requests will be honored. Other third-party requests may be considered
adequate by the Revenue Cabinet to "trigger" the refund claim. Kentucky Society
of Certified Public Accountants, Intangibles Tax Update (visited Oct. 30, 1997)
<http://www.kycpa.org/intangib.htm>.
417 See St. LedgerfI, 942 S.W.2d at 899-900.
438 See Board of Educ. v. Taulbee, 706 S.W.2d 827, 832 (Ky. 1986) (Leibson,
J., dissenting).
419 Statutory notice requirements regarding matters affecting taxpayers' sub-
stantial interests abound, but there are none in this area. Case law does not appear
to direct that notice be given, either. See, e.g., K.R.S. § 131.181 (Michie Supp.
1996) (requiring Cabinet to provide notice of delinquency to taxpayers who hold
coal mining licenses that their licenses are in danger of revocation); id. § 132.310
(stating the Cabinet shall provide notice of assessments on property that taxpayers
failed to list for assessment); id. § 133.160 (Michie 1991) (requiring the Cabinet
to provide notice to taxpayers when planning to raise property assessments); id. §
134.420 (Michie Supp. 1996) (mandating that Cabinet must provide notice of tax
liens to taxpayers); id. § 138.880 (requiring Cabinet to send notice to taxpayers of
assessments on illegal drugs seized by law enforcement); id. § 139.680 (Michie
1991) (stating that Cabinet must give notice to purchasers of business or stock of
personal tax liability if they fail to withhold purchase price); id. § 144.130 (Michie
Supp. 1996) (requiring Cabinet to give immediate notice of determination of tax
credit applications of certificated air carriers); id. § 211.392 (Michie 1995)
(requiring Cabinet to give notice and opportunity for conference prior to certificate
modification or revocation to fluidized bed combustion technology tax exemption
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ized cross-indexes to know the identity of each taxpayer and the amount of
each tax wrongfully paid, whether a lawsuit challenging a taxing statute's
constitutionality is an individual suit or a class action.440 Although the deck
appears stacked against individual taxpayers who have much to lose
(particularly given the short time frame allowed to apply for refunds), it is
doubtful that the problem of what constitutes an application can be resolved
by the Supreme Court; rather, the Revenue Cabinet should resolve it
through rulemaking, specifying a procedure to be followed under section
134.590(2).
B. The Protected Class that Wasn't
Thus, even though section 134.590(b) provided retroactive relief and
federal due process concerns were addressed, limiting financial recovery
to two years from the date each taxpayer individually filed an application
for tax refund - instead of two years from the date the lawsuit was filed or
certificate holders); id. § 224.01-310 (requiring notice and an opportunity for
hearing before revocation of pollution control tax exemption certificate
modification or revocation); id. § 247.920 (Michie 1994) (requiring notice and
opportunity for hearing to be given to the Coal Marketing and Export Council
before issuance to taxpayer of alcohol production tax exemption certificate, and
requiring notice to taxpayer and the Coal Marketing and Export Council before
certificate modification or revocation).
The Revenue Cabinet did not publish notice of the need for taxpayers to file
protective claims to preserve their refunds until March 1993 in the Kentucky Tax
Alert, almost three years after the initial litigation had been filed. See Kentucky
Revenue Cabinet, Kentucky Tax Alert, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Mar. 1993). The Kentucky
Tax Alert is not a general circulation publication and is sent primarily to
professionals; thus, the class of those receiving notice was small. Moreover, the
March issue misleadingly advised that the statutory provision being challenged
governed "the exemption from intangible tax of stock owned by in-state
corporations." Id. at 1; see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 8. Previous
issues had discussed St. Ledger (see, e.g., Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, Kentucky
Tax Alert, Vol. 11, No. 8 (Aug. 1992)), but had advised taxpayers to "continue to
pay taxes under existing law as they have in previous years," without advising them
of the need to file protective claims to preserve their right to potential refunds. See
id.
44o See Brammer, supra note 27. Although the intangibles tax had been on the
books for 178 years, the Revenue Cabinet had never bother to enforce it until the
state computerized its tax roll in 1987, cross-referencing tax returns with tax
investments. See supra notes 236-38.
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two years after it was resolved - created two classes of taxpayers. In the
words of Justice Graves:
[I]t is likely the more wealthy, better informed, and better publicly
served class will receive refunds back to 1988. However, unsophisticated,
intangible property owners ... will be limited to two years .... This will
be perceived as a basic inequity that privileges the wealthy and penalizes
the less fortunate. Also, all Kentucky taxpayers will be billed to repay a
small privileged class.
If a private citizen had behaved in such a confiscatory manner in
appropriating under color of a law a constitutionally challenged entitle-
ment, he would be arrested for failure to make required disposition of
property.
441
But the Commonwealth of Kentucky does not behave in the way "it
mandates its citizens to behave." 2 And the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution does not protect those injured from wealth-based
class distinctions very well, particularly when the class distinctions are
between groups of people with varying degrees of wealth (as opposed to
those who are poor and those who are wealthy)." 3 Further, equal protection
44' St. Ledger 1, 942 S.W.2d at 903 (Graves, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Graves, J., dissenting).
13 The United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to treat wealth-
based classifications as suspect under the Equal Protection Clause. Wealth
classifications do not activate heightened scrutiny and its protections - at least
without being linked to a clearly fundamental right like voting, for example. See,
e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2185 (1996) (stating that a prison's policy
of restricting access to the prison law library and legal assistance for indigent
prisoners in lock-down did not violate equal protection, even where the delays
caused by the restrictions resulted in actual injury); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub.
Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 457-61 (1988) (holding that a North Dakota statute that
permitted school bus districts to charge a user fee for bus transportation did not
unconstitutionally place greater obstacles to education on the poor than on the
wealthy); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973)
(stating that children who received poorer quality education due to lack of family
wealth and its impact on school funding did not have a constitutional complaint;
only if children were completely deprived of schooling would equal protection
under a wealth-based classification be invoked); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,
141-42 (1971) (holding that wealth classifications did not invoke heightened
scrutiny and upholding a constitutional amendment preventing low-income housing
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challenges to state tax refund statutes have fared poorly,'" largely because
wealth-based classifications are subject to the lowest level of scrutiny"'
and because it is difficult to categorize those receiving an unfair tax refund
as a suspect class" for purposes of equal protection review.
For example, in American States Insurance Co. v. Michigan Depart-
ment of Treasury,"7 taxpayers who had successfully challenged an
unconstitutional retaliatory tax in the Insurance Code were precluded from
obtaining some tax refunds due to the ninety-day time period allotted for
filing for refunds of taxes paid under taxing statutes found to be unconstitu-
tional. 48 They argued that section 205.27a(6) of the Michigan Compiled
laws violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
because it treated the "preemption claimants," taxpayers whose claims for
refunds stemmed from a state statute being preempted by the federal
from being built in any communi that did not vote to have it built); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-68 (1966) (striking poll tax because
it drew lines on the basis of wealth and property).
4 See, e.g., Axtell v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 795,801-02 (D. Wyo. 1994)
(stating that federal tax statute did not create a suspect class of taxpayers who
received correctly addressed notices of deficiency simply because it provided a
three-year statute of limitations for making tax assessments against those who
received misaddressed notices of tax deficiency, but only a two-year statute of
limitations against those who received properly addressed notices); Hundert v.
Bieszczat, 526 F. Supp. 1051, 1054-55 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that Illinois tax
system, which (after a lawsuit) only refunded excessive taxes to taxpayers who
filed under protest, did not create a suspect class of the non-protesting taxpayers
because Illinois had many rational reasons for its conduct, including the
administrative complexity of figuring out who was entitled to refunds); Fierro &
Sons, Inc. v. Division of Revenue, 1988 W.L. 109306, *2 (Del. Super. Ct) (finding
that tax statute limiting taxpayers to three years to file for a refund for taxes
erroneously paid while allowing the state an additional time period did not make
the taxpayers a suspect class).
"s See, e.g., discussion at supra note 70.
446 See American States Ins. Co. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 560 N.W.2d
644, 648 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
"' American States Ins. Co. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 560 N.W.2d 644
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
448 See id. at 648. The Michigan statute provided: "[A] claim for refund based
upon the validity of a tax law based on the laws or the constitution of the United
States or the state constitution of 1963 shall not be paid unless the claim is filed
within 90 days after the date set for filing a return." MICH. COMP. LAWS §
205.27a(6) (West Supp. 1997).
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Constitution or a federal law,449 differently than other taxpayers who sought
and were able to receive tax refunds.450 In order for the preemption
claimants to establish an equal protection violation, they would have had
to show that they were part of a suspect class and that the statute of
limitations to which they objected impinged upon a fundamental constitu-
tional right.45 The preemption claimants could not establish that they were
a protected class, since they did not belong to a group "'saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.' "452 The
Michigan court found that the taxpayers were a "'large, diverse and
amorphous class, unified only by the common factor that the Insurance
Code [had] been declared invalid.' ,4 53 Moreover, the right they sought to
vindicate, the right to a tax refund, was not a fundamental right.454 Since the
preemption claimants were neither part of a suspect class nor vindicating
a fundamental right, they were only entitled to a review of their claims
under the rational relationship test,455 and as long as a governmental entity
has some rational basis for making the class distinction, it will stand. 6
Here, Michigan limited preemption claimants' refunds because their claims
applied to large groups of people, and thus would have a tremendous
impact on Michigan's revenue if refunds were not limited.457 The Michigan
Court of Appeals, therefore, rejected the preemption taxpayers' claim on
the basis that protecting the state's treasury was a legitimate state
purpose. 458
Similarly, what state purpose could be more compelling than protecting
the Commonwealth of Kentucky's "fiscal security" when a tax scheme is
declared unconstitutional, through limiting the amount of time during
"4 See American States Ins. Co., 560 N.W.2d at 646.
450 See id. at 648.
451 See id.
452 Id. (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973)).
41 Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28).
414 See id. at 649 (citing Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gossum, 887 S.W.2d
329 (Ky. 1994)).
45 See id. at 648-50.
456 See id. at 650. Cf. St. LedgerII, 942 S.W.2d 893,901 (Ky.), cert. dismissed,
118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).




which refunds can be claimed?459 It was undisputed that "refunds under an
unconstitutional statute [would] involve multitudes of taxpayers and
millions of dollars."46 While allowing only two years of refunds under
section 134.590(2) would still likely cost the Commonwealth $208
million461 in refunds, providing refunds to taxpayers from 1988 forward
might have cost Kentucky nearly $320 million in refunds.462 The refunds
of wrongly collected taxes, however, need not have "cost ' 6s the Common-
wealth anything because St. Ledger had sought an injunction after the case
was filed in 1990 to place the monies collected by the Revenue Cabinet in
escrow pending the outcome of the litigation.' In fact, the United States
Supreme Court in McKesson Corp. suggested that placing challenged tax
payments into an escrow account would be an excellent accounting device
by which a state could "predict with greater accuracy the availability of
undisputed treasury funds." 5 St. Ledger "moved the trial court for a
temporary injunction requiring [the] Revenue Cabinet to escrow into a
separate, interest-bearing account, all monies collected from the Corporate
Shares Tax during the pendency of the action. 466 St. Ledger, however, was
unsuccessful in this attempt to protect taxes paid for future refunds.467
What has been created, therefore, is a way for the Commonwealth to
behave in a highly confiscatory manner, but legally get away with it. This
is not unlike a person on a crowded street who falls victim to a pickpocket,
419 See St. Ledger I, 942 S.W.2d at 900 (citing Gossum, 887 S.W.2d at 335).
460 Id.
461 Interestingly, the amount of money in the Commonwealth's "rainy day" or
budget reserve trust fund was about $200 million. See Tom Loftus, U.S. Supreme
Court Ruling May Cost State $200 Million, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville,
Ky.), May 21, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Loftus, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling May
Cost State $200 Million].
462 See Memorandum, Consensus Forecasting Group, supra note 282.
463 Ultimately, to help pay for intangibles refunds and to raise monies for a
$100 million increase in funding for higher education, the Commonwealth sold
$200 million worth of tax and revenue anticipation notes. See Jim Molis, Kentucky
Lawmakers Authorize Debt for Capital Projects, Easing Cash Flow, THE BOND
BUYER, June 10, 1997.
464 See Loftus, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling May Cost State $200 Million, supra
note 461.
465 McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S.
18,45 (1990).
466 Appellant's Brief, supra note 275, at 30.
467 See St. Ledger II, 942 S.W.2d 893 (Ky.), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27
(1997).
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discovering the theft hours later. When he reports the crime to the police,
he is informed that all thefts must be reported at the time of the theft, or
within an hour of it. He explains that, had he known he was being robbed,
he certainly would have reported it immediately. In fact, he did call the
police soon as he discovered the wallet missing. This plea, however, falls
on deaf ears. Imagine as well that he actually locates the thief on his own,
still possessing the wallet, but because in the meantime the thief has used
the money to pay back rent, the police are unwilling to press charges. 8
This is the same as saying that while a "[s]tate's interest in financial
stability does not justify a refusal to provide relief,"469 it does justify
procedural restrictions that assure minimal disruption to the state's coffers.
The right to recover a tax refund is not a fundamental right.47 Thus, the
Commonwealth may collect a discriminatory tax, deliberately refuse to
protect those funds while in litigation, then plead that it would deplete the
state coffers to return what it wrongfully took in the first place. "It is
obvious that the Commonwealth is using its superior position of power to
an unfair advantage because if someone does not file a claim, the Common-
wealth will be able to keep some of what it forcibly and illegally took." 7 1
Such behavior should not be rewarded; the General Assembly should step
in to correct what it previously permitted, either by amending the statute to
allow refund applications to be filed back to 1988, or at a minimum by
extending the period of refund.472
46 For many other types of claims, the statute of limitations is tolled by lack
of notice. The limitations period for several statutory claims does not begin to run
until the date from which the injury was discovered or reasonably should have been
discovered. See, e.g., K.R.S. § 413.130(3) (Michie 1992) (fraud or mistake); id. §
413.140(l)(e) & (2) (claims for medical malpractice); id. § 413.245 (professional
service malpractice actions). Cf. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Whittaker, 883 S.W.2d 514,
515-16 (holding that employee who did not receive notice from his employer that
it was terminating his temporary total disability benefits was entitled to tolling of
the statute of limitations for filing his claim). But see Lashlee v. Sumner, 570 F.2d
107, 110 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that under Kentucky law, the fact that a plaintiff
did not learn of a libelous report against him until several months after its
publication did not toll the period of limitations provided by section
413.140(l)(d)).
469 McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 50.
470 See American States Ins. Co. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 560 N.W.2d
644,649 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gossum, 887
S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1994)).
471 St. Ledger I, 942 S.W.2d at 902 (Graves, J., dissenting).
472 Justice Graves believed that the refund period should be extended back to
1988 to provide meaningful retroactive relief underMcKesson Corp. See id. at 903
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C. Solutions Provided by Other States
It is evident that Kentucky's approach is unfair and unjust to those
unlawfully deprived of income from investments through the unconstitu-
tional corporate shares tax, then lawfully deprived of refunds through
section 134.590(2). But have other states done better by their citizens?
Unfortunately, the answer is sometimes yes, sometimes no. Although relief
under section 134.590(2) is limited to instances where taxpayers can file an
application for refund within two years of their last tax payment, that
limited relief is more generous than what many states allow.
For example, as noted in McKesson Corp., until ordered to do so by the
United States Supreme Court, Florida provided no relief, either pre- or
post-deprivation, to taxpayers under its unconstitutional excise tax.4
Michigan, as noted above, provided that in order to seek a refund under an
unconstitutional tax, claimants had to protest within ninety days after filing
a return.474 Examples of shorter time frames abound: in Missouri, a protest
is required at the time of payment;475 in North Carolina, thirty days after tax
payment.476 But legislators in North Carolina believed the state had a
(Graves, J., dissenting).
" See McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 51.
474 See American States Ins. Co., 560 N.W.2d at 646.
475 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 139.031(1) (West Supp. 1998) ("Any taxpayer may
protest all or any part of any taxes assessed against him, except taxes collected by
the director of revenue of Missouri. Any such taxpayer desiring to pay any taxes
under protest shall, at the time of paying such taxes, file with the collector a written
statement setting forth the grounds on which his protest is based."); American
States Ins. Co., 560 N.W.2d at 647 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 962 F.2d 762, 766
(8th Cir. 1992)).
476 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-267 (1997). This statutes states:
No court of this State shall entertain a suit of any kind brought for the
purpose of preventing the collection of any tax imposed in this Subchapter.
Whenever a person has a valid defense to the enforcement of the collection
of a tax, the person shall pay the tax to the proper officer, and that payment
shall be without prejudice to any defense of rights the person may have
regarding the tax. At any time within the applicable protest period, the
taxpayer may demand a refund of the tax paid in writing from the Secretary
and if the tax is not refunded within 90 days thereafter, may sue the
Secretary in the courts of the State for the amount demanded.
See also American States Ins. Co., 560 N.W.2d at 647 (citing Swanson v. North
Carolina, 441 S.E.2d 537, 545 (N.C. 1994)).
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"'moral obligation to pay everybody,' 1171 eventhough estimates of liability
for refunds ranged from $300 million to over $500 million.478 The
legislature changed the deadline for filing an application for a tax refund
from thirty days to a year from the date of payment.4 79 Even though North
Carolina's legislature acted to rectify the perceived injustice of a short time
frame for requesting tax refunds, North Carolina's extended one-year
refund period is still shorter than Kentucky's two-year period.
On the other hand, a few other states go beyond section 134.590(2) in
the relief they offer. Pennsylvania allows taxpayers to file a claim for
refund of taxes collected under an unconstitutional statute within three
years of payment or settlement of the taxes due.480 California481 allows
refund claims to be filed four years from the date any constitutional
amendment is passed to rectify unconstitutional taxing statutes. Florida
177 Christopher McEntee, Trends in the Region: School Bond, Tax Liability
Issues Preoccupy North Carolina, THE BOND BUYER, May 2, 1996, available in
1996 WL 5638030 (page numbers unavailable on-line) (quoting North Carolina
Senate Appropriations Committee member Gerald Blackmon).
478 See id.
479 See Danny Johnson, N.C. Tax Changes May Benefit Your Firm, THE BUS.
J., Nov. 18, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11865126 (page numbers unavailable on-
line).
480 See 1997 Pa. Legis. Serv. 1997-7 (House Bill 134), available in Westlaw,
PA. LEGIS. 1997-7, to be codified at 72 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3003.1. This law
provides:
When any tax or other money has been paid to the Commonwealth under
a provision of this act or any other statute subsequently held by final
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional or
under an interpretation of such provision subsequently held by such court
to be erroneous, a petition for refund may be filed with the department
either prior or subsequent to such final judgment but must be filed within
three years of the payment of which a refund is requested, or within three
years of the settlement of such taxes or other moneys due the
Commonwealth, whichever period last expires.
481 See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 5096.5 (West Supp. 1998). This statute
states:
Any taxes paid which were not erroneously or illegally collected under the
law as it existed at the time of collection, but for which an exemption is
provided by a retroactive constitutional amendment, shall be refunded after
compliance with the provisions of this article, except that the claim for
refund may be filed at any time within four years after the date such




allows three to five years, depending on when the claim to a refund
accrued.482 Virginia provides that refund applications are to be filed (on
specific forms) within three years of the date the tax is assessed.483 Clearly,
other states see longer time frames as being the most reasonable way to
approach tax refunds where an unconstitutional tax has been stricken. At
a minimum, the Kentucky General Assembly could extend the period of
refund, so that Kentucky taxpayers could recoup a larger portion of their
loss.484 It is, after all, only fair.
CONCLUSION
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision inFulton Corp.
and subsequent vacation of St. Ledger I, the Kentucky Supreme Court was
wise to hold that the exemption provided for stock of in-state companies
was not severable from Kentucky's intangibles tax scheme. A contrary
holding would have transgressed Kentucky's long-accepted public policy
against double taxation, contravened the clear legislative intent that the
Kentucky intangibles tax avoid subjecting corporate shareholders to double
482 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.26(2) (West Supp. 1998). The statute provides:
Application for refunds as provided by this section must be filed with the
Comptroller, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, within 3 years
after the right to the refund has accrued or else the right is barred. Except
as provided in chapter 198 and s. 220.23, an application for a refund of a
tax enumerated in s. 72.011, which tax was paid after September 30, 1994,
must be filed with the Comptroller within 5 years after the date the tax is
paid.
483 See VA. CODE. ANN. § 58.1-1824 (Michie 1997). This statute provides:
Any person who has paid an assessment of taxes administered by the
Department of Taxation may preserve his judicial remedies by filing a claim
for refund with the Tax Commissioner on forms prescribed by the
Department within three years of the date such tax was assessed. Such
taxpayer may, at any time before the end of one year after the date of the
Tax Commissioner's decision on such claim, seek redress from the circuit
courtunder § 58.1-1825. The Tax Commissioner may decide such claim on
the merits in the manner provided in § 58.1-1822 for appeals under §
58.1-1821, or may, in his discretion, hold such claim without decision
pending the conclusion of litigation affecting such claim. The fact that such
claim is pending shall not be a bar to any other action under this chapter.
484 Justice Graves thought the refund period should be extended to 1988 at
minimum. See St. Ledger II, 942 S.W.2d 893, 903 (Ky.) (Graves, J., dissenting),
cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).
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taxation, and amounted to an unconstitutional encroachment upon
legislative authority. 48 5
The result in St. Ledger II, however, greatly limited the taxpayers'
victory in St. Ledger I. The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision, albeit
restricted by the mandates of section 134.590,46 unjustly discriminates
against inexperienced intangible property owners, particularly many senior
citizens living on fixed incomes from retirement investments.487
To alleviate St. Ledger H's discriminatory result in favor of the
wealthier and more sophisticated investors, the Kentucky General
Assembly should affirmatively act to provide a better opportunity for less
savvy investors to recoup their losses. An extension of the time frame
within which a refund application may be filed would afford such an
opportunity. Until more affirmative relief is provided, the taxpayer victory
in St. Ledger Iwill remain hollow for the many Kentucky taxpayers who
were subjected for years to Kentucky's illegal intangibles tax.
485 See supra notes 33941 and accompanying text.
486 See supra notes 362-92 and accompanying text.
481 See supra notes 354-60 and accompanying text.
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